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A Politico-Economic Model of Public Expenditure and Income Taxation

AuthorsEsteban, Joan ; Mayoral, Laura
KeywordsGovernment Policy, Income Taxation, Public Expenditure
Issue Date25-Nov-2013
PublisherBarcelona Graduate School of Economics
CitationBarcelona GSE Working Paper, nº 743 (2013)
AbstractWe model the political process as consisting of voting on the issue considered salient, public expenditure, with a subsequent consensus over size of government and income taxation. We prove that for each majoritarian choice there is a unique consensus policy on progressivity and government size. We empirically validate the implication that the sign of the relationship between inequality and progressivity chosen by the median voter is conditional on the degree of substitutability between government and market supplied goods. We also obtain that this substitutability has a negative impact on the negative marginal effect of inequality on the size of government
DescriptionPublicado como: Barcelona GSE Working Paper, nº 743, November 2013 Presentada conferencia en: Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat Rovira Virgili, Reus (Tarragona), el 4 de marzo de 2014
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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