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A Many-to-Many Rural Hospital Theorem

AuthorsKlijn, Flip ; Yazici, Ayse
Keywordsmatching, many-to-many, stability, rural hospital theorem
Issue DateJun-2011
PublisherBarcelona Graduate School of Economics
CitationBarcelona GSE Working Paper, nº 567 (2014)
AbstractWe show that the full version of the so-called ‘rural hospital theorem’ generalizes to many-to-many matching problems where agents on both sides of the problem have substitutable and weakly separable preferences. We reinforce our result by showing that when agents’ preferences satisfy substitutability, the domain of weakly separable preferences is also maximal for the rural hospital theorem to hold
DescriptionPublicado como: Barcelona GSE Working Paper, nº 567, June 2011 (versiones September 2012; January 2014)
Presentado en: ESRC Game Theory Workshop "Matching Under Preferences" celebrado el 6 de febrero de 2013 en Londres (Reino Unido)
Presentado el 3 de febrero de 2014 en el AMSE-GREQAM Seminar, celebrado en Marseille (Francia)
Presentado el 10 de abril de 2014 en el Meeting of COST Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice, COST European Cooperation in Science and Technology, celebrado del 9 al 11 de abril de 2014 en Maastricht (Holanda)
Presentado el 27 de octubre de 2014 en el Barcelona JOCS, Seminar on Game Theory and its Applications, celebrado en Barcelona (España)
Presentado el 30 de octubre de 2014 en el seminario del Departamento de Economía de la Universidad Pública de Navarra.
Presentado el 8 de noviembre de 2014 en el 2014 Annual Meeting of the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists (ASSET), celebrado del 6 al 8 de noviembre de 2014 en Aix-en-Provence (Francia)
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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