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Playing hard to get: Theory and evidence on layoffs, recalls, and unemployment

AutorRodríguez-Planas, Núria
Palabras claveAsymmetric information
laid-off workers
Fecha de publicación2013
EditorEmerald Group Publishing
CitaciónNew Analyses of Worker Well-Being (Research in Labor Economics 38: 211- 258 (2013))
ResumenThis paper is the first to present empirical evidence consistent with models of signaling through unemployment and to uncover a new stylized fact using the 1988-2006 Displaced Worker Supplement (DWS) of the Current Population Survey (CPS), namely that, among white-collar workers, post-displacement earnings fall less rapidly with unemployment spells for layoffs than for plant closings. Because high-productivity workers are more likely to be recalled than low-productivity ones, they may choose to signal their productivity though unemployment, in which case the duration of unemployment may be positively related to postdisplacement wages. Identification is done using workers whose plant closed as they cannot be recalled, and no incentives to signal arise. Copyright © 2013 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
DescripciónCapítulo en: POLACHEK, Solomon, W.; TATSIRAMOS, Konstantinos (eds.). New Analyses of Worker Well-Being. [S.l.]: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2013, p.211-258 (Research in Labor Economics ; vol. 38, ISSN 0147-9121). ISBN 978-1-78350-056-7, eISBN: 978-1-78350-057-4. DOI 10.1108/S0147-9121(2013)0000038007
Versión del editorhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1108/S0147-9121(2013)0000038007
Identificadoresdoi: 10.1108/S0147-9121(2013)0000038007
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