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Título

Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare

AutorJaramillo, Paula; Kayi, Çagatay; Klijn, Flip
Palabras claveDeferred acceptance
Dropping strategies
Filled positions
Many-to-one matching
Nash equilibrium
Welfare
Fecha de publicación2-oct-2013
EditorAcademic Press
CitaciónGames and Economic Behavior 82: 693-701 (2013)
ResumenWe study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium outcomes can be unstable. We prove that any stable matching is obtained in some equilibrium. We also show that the exhaustive class of dropping strategies does not necessarily generate the full set of equilibrium outcomes. Finally, we find that the 'rural hospital theorem' cannot be extended to the set of equilibrium outcomes and that welfare levels are in general unrelated to the set of stable matchings. Two important consequences are that, contrary to one-to-one matching markets, (a) filled positions depend on the equilibrium that is reached and (b) welfare levels are not bounded by the optimal stable matchings (with respect to the true preferences). © 2013 Elsevier Inc.
Versión del editorhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/125692
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001
Identificadoresdoi: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001
issn: 0899-8256
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