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dc.contributor.authorCardona, Daniel-
dc.contributor.authorPonsatí, Clara-
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-24T14:02:47Z-
dc.date.available2015-11-24T14:02:47Z-
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.identifierissn: 1545-2921-
dc.identifier.citationEconomics Bulletin 33(1): 278-287 (2013)-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/125661-
dc.description.abstractThis note presents numerical simulations computing quota rules that maximize collective surplus for populations choosing a one-dimensional policy through bargaining and voting. These computations are based on the characterization of the unique (asymptotic) equilibrium of Cardona and Ponsati (2011). We show that under quadratic utility functions, the unique quota rule that maximizes collective surplus ranges from 80% to 95%-
dc.description.sponsorshipFinancial support from grants ECO2009-08820, ECO2009-06953, ECO2012-34046 and SGR2009-1051 is gratefully acknowledged-
dc.publisherEconomics Bulletin-
dc.relation.isversionofPublisher's version-
dc.rightsclosedAccess-
dc.titleSuper-majorites and Collective Surplus in One-dimensional Bargaining: Numerical Simulations-
dc.typeartículo-
dc.date.updated2015-11-24T14:02:48Z-
dc.description.versionPeer Reviewed-
dc.language.rfc3066eng-
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad (España)-
dc.relation.csic-
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329es_ES
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