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Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/125651
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dc.contributor.authorCardona, Daniel-
dc.contributor.authorPonsatí, Clara-
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-24T13:08:02Z-
dc.date.available2015-11-24T13:08:02Z-
dc.date.issued2014-10-08-
dc.identifierdoi: 10.1111/jpet.12091-
dc.identifierissn: 1467-9779-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Public Economic Theory 16(6): 884-898 (2014)-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/125651-
dc.descriptionPart of this paper was included in an early draft entitled “Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of supermajority rules-
dc.description.abstract© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. In the setting of a one-dimensional legislative bargaining game, we characterize qualified majority rules maximizing social surplus, that is, the sum of individual benefits. The simple majority rule maximizes social surplus when individual utilities are tent-shaped. When the utilities are strictly concave, the surplus maximizing rule is a strict supermajority.-
dc.description.sponsorshipFinancial support from grants EC02009-08820, EC0-2012-34046, SGR2009-1051, and Barcelona-GSE Research is gratefully acknowledged-
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing-
dc.rightsclosedAccess-
dc.titleSuper-majorites, one-dimensional policies, and social surplus-
dc.typeartículo-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/jpet.12091-
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12091-
dc.date.updated2015-11-24T13:08:04Z-
dc.description.versionPeer Reviewed-
dc.language.rfc3066eng-
dc.contributor.funderBarcelona Graduate School of Economics-
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad (España)-
dc.relation.csicSí-
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329es_ES
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501es_ES
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.openairetypeartículo-
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