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Super-majorites, one-dimensional policies, and social surplus

AuthorsCardona, Daniel; Ponsatí, Clara
Issue Date8-Oct-2014
PublisherBlackwell Publishing
CitationJournal of Public Economic Theory 16(6): 884-898 (2014)
Abstract© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. In the setting of a one-dimensional legislative bargaining game, we characterize qualified majority rules maximizing social surplus, that is, the sum of individual benefits. The simple majority rule maximizes social surplus when individual utilities are tent-shaped. When the utilities are strictly concave, the surplus maximizing rule is a strict supermajority.
DescriptionPart of this paper was included in an early draft entitled “Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of supermajority rules
Publisher version (URL)http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12091
Identifiersdoi: 10.1111/jpet.12091
issn: 1467-9779
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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