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Title

Market distortions and government transparency

AuthorsAlbornoz, Facundo; Esteban, Joan ; Vanin, Paolo
Issue Date15-Jan-2014
PublisherJohn Wiley & Sons
CitationJournal of the European Economic Association 12(1): 200-222 (2014)
AbstractIn this paper, we investigate how government transparency depends on economic distortions. We first consider an abstract class of economies in which a benevolent policy maker is privately informed about the exogenous state of the economy and contemplates whether to release this information. Our key result is that distortions limit communication: even if transparency is ex ante Pareto superior to opaqueness, it cannot constitute an equilibrium when distortions are sufficiently high. We next confirm this broad insight in two applied contexts, in which monopoly power and income taxes are the specific sources of distortions. © 2014 by the European Economic Association.
DescriptionA previous version circulated under the title “Government Information Transparency”
Publisher version (URL)http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12052
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/125633
DOIhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12052
Identifiersdoi: 10.1111/jeea.12052
issn: 1542-4766
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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