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Title

Representing a democratic constituency in negotiations: delegation versus ratification

AuthorsCardona, Daniel; Ponsatí, Clara
Issue Date16-May-2015
PublisherSpringer
CitationSocial Choice and Welfare 45(2): 399-414 (2015)
Abstract© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. We consider negotiations where one of the parties is a group that must send a representative to the bargaining table. We examine the trade-offs that the group faces in choosing between two different regimes for this representation: (i) Delegation where the representative is granted full authority to reach an agreement, and (ii) Ratification, where any agreement reached by the representative requires a posterior ratification vote. We show that when the group has flexibility—to select the delegate or to set the majority threshold for ratification—the majority of the group favors delegation. Only when the flexibility is limited or delegates are (sufficiently) unreliable will the majority of the group prefer ratification.
Publisher version (URL)http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0895-2
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/125490
DOIhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0895-2
Identifiersdoi: 10.1007/s00355-015-0895-2
issn: 0176-1714
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