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On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist

AuthorsMenicucci, Domenico; Hurkens, Sjaak ; Jeon, Doh-Shin
KeywordsMonopoly pricing
Multi-dimensional mechanism design
Price discrimination
Pure bundling
Issue Date1-Oct-2015
CitationJournal of Mathematical Economics 60: 33-42 (2015)
Abstract© 2015 Elsevier B.V. This paper considers a monopolist selling two objects to a single buyer with privately observed valuations. We prove that if the virtual valuation for each object is non-negative for all possible types, then the optimal price schedule is such that the objects are sold only in a bundle. Under an additional regularity condition, pure bundling is the optimal sale mechanism among all individually rational and incentive compatible mechanisms.
Publisher version (URL)http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.011
Identifiersdoi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.011
issn: 1873-1538
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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