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Title

Dynamic contracts and learning by doing

AuthorsPrat, Julien
KeywordsDynamic incentives
Human capital
Moral hazard
Principal agent model
Issue Date22-Aug-2014
PublisherSpringer
CitationMathematics and Financial Economics 9(3): 169-193 (2015)
Abstract© 2014, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents learn by doing. We derive a condition under which contracts are fully incentive compatible. A closed-form solution is obtained when agents have CARA utility. It shows that human capital accumulation strengthens the power of incentives and allows the principal to provide the agent with better insurance against transitory risks.
Publisher version (URL)http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11579-014-0120-6
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/125447
DOI10.1007/s11579-014-0120-6
Identifiersdoi: 10.1007/s11579-014-0120-6
issn: 1862-9660
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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