Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/125447COMPARTIR / EXPORTAR:
 SHARE
 CORE
BASE
|
|
| Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL | DATACITE | |
| Título: | Dynamic contracts and learning by doing |
Autor: | Prat, Julien CSIC | Palabras clave: | Dynamic incentives Human capital Moral hazard Principal agent model |
Fecha de publicación: | 22-ago-2014 | Editor: | Springer Nature | Citación: | Mathematics and Financial Economics 9(3): 169-193 (2015) | Resumen: | © 2014, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents learn by doing. We derive a condition under which contracts are fully incentive compatible. A closed-form solution is obtained when agents have CARA utility. It shows that human capital accumulation strengthens the power of incentives and allows the principal to provide the agent with better insurance against transitory risks. | Versión del editor: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11579-014-0120-6 | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/125447 | DOI: | 10.1007/s11579-014-0120-6 | Identificadores: | doi: 10.1007/s11579-014-0120-6 issn: 1862-9660 |
| Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Artículos |
Ficheros en este ítem:
| Fichero | Descripción | Tamaño | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| accesoRestringido.pdf | 15,38 kB | Adobe PDF |  Visualizar/Abrir |
CORE Recommender
SCOPUSTM
Citations
5
checked on 18-abr-2024
WEB OF SCIENCETM
Citations
6
checked on 25-feb-2024
Page view(s)
275
checked on 24-abr-2024
Download(s)
103
checked on 24-abr-2024
Google ScholarTM
Check
Altmetric
Altmetric
NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.