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dc.contributor.authorVillatoro, Daniel-
dc.contributor.authorAndrighetto, Giulia-
dc.contributor.authorBrandts, Jordi-
dc.contributor.authorNardin, Luis Gustavo-
dc.contributor.authorSabater-Mir, Jordi-
dc.contributor.authorConte, Rosaria-
dc.date.accessioned2015-03-13T11:49:56Z-
dc.date.available2015-03-13T11:49:56Z-
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.identifierdoi: 10.1177/0894439313511396-
dc.identifierissn: 1552-8286-
dc.identifier.citationSocial Science Computer Review 32(3): 334-353 (2014)-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/112342-
dc.description.abstract© The Author(s) 2013. Punishment plays a crucial role in favoring and maintaining social order. Recent studies emphasize the effect of the norm-signaling function of punishment. However, very little attention has been paid so far to the potential of group punishment. We claim that when inflicted by an entire group, the recipient of punishment views it as expressing norms. The experiments performed in this work provide evidence that humans are motivated not only by material incentives that punishment imposes but also by normative information that it conveys. The same material incentive has a different effect on the individuals’ future compliance depending on the way it is implemented, having a stronger effect when it also conveys normative information. We put forward the hypothesis that by inflicting equal material incentives, group punishment is more effective in enhancing compliance than uncoordinated punishment, because it takes advantage of the norm-signaling function of punishment. In support of our hypothesis, we present cross-methodological data, that is, data obtained through agent-based simulation and laboratory experiments with human subjects. The combination of these two methods allows us to provide an explanation for the proximate mechanisms generating the cooperative behavior observed in the laboratory experiment.-
dc.description.sponsorshipThe author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: MacNorms project (Intramurales de frontera CSIC—PIF08-007) The Institute of Cognitive Science and Technologies (ISTC-CNR, Rome), the European University Institute, the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Grant: ECO2011-29847-C02-01), the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2009 SGR 820 and Grant 2009SGR1434), the Antoni Serra Ramoneda Research Chair (UAB-CatalunyaCaixa) for supporting the authors.-
dc.publisherSage Publications-
dc.rightsclosedAccess-
dc.subjectpunishment-
dc.subjectlaboratory experiments-
dc.subjectcooperation-
dc.subjectagent-based simulation-
dc.subjectnorms-
dc.titleThe Norm-Signaling Effects of Group Punishment: Combining Agent-Based Simulation and Laboratory Experiments-
dc.typeartículo-
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/0894439313511396-
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0894439313511396-
dc.date.updated2015-03-13T11:49:56Z-
dc.description.versionPeer Reviewed-
dc.language.rfc3066eng-
dc.contributor.funderConsejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (España)-
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad (España)-
dc.contributor.funderIstituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione-
dc.contributor.funderEuropean University Institute-
dc.contributor.funderGeneralitat de Catalunya-
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003339es_ES
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329es_ES
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003942es_ES
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100001686es_ES
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100002809es_ES
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