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Título

Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules

AutorCardona, Daniel; Ponsatí, Clara
Fecha de publicación17-dic-2008
SerieUFAE and IAE Working Papers ; 762.08
ResumenWe consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provided. We supply an explicit formula to determine the unique alternative that prevails, as impatience vanishes, for each majority. As an application, we examine the efficiency of majority rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. For asymmetric populations rules maximizing social surplus are characterized.
Descripción39 pages, 7 figures.-- Trabajo presentado al congreso "Annual Conference of the Association for Public Economic Theory PET10" celebrado en Turquía en 2010.
Versión del editorhttp://pareto.uab.es/wp/2009/76209.pdf
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/10540
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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