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Title

Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities

AuthorsMacho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David
KeywordsShapley value
Dividends
Games with externalities
Implementation
Issue Date1-Dec-2008
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers ; 758.08
AbstractWe consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of dividends for each player, over all the coalitions that contain the player, coincides with the corresponding average value of the player. We then construct weighted Shapley values by departing from equal division of dividends and finally, for each such value, provide a bidding mechanism implementing it.
Description18 pages.
Publisher version (URL)http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2008/75808.pdf
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/10532
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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