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Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

AuthorsCalsamiglia, Caterina; Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip
KeywordsSchool choice
Top trading cycles
Boston mechanism
Safety school
Issue Date17-Nov-2008
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers ; 757.08
AbstractThe literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferences. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools play an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy.
Description31 pages, 18 tables.-- JEL classification: C72, C78, D78, I20.-- Trabajo publicado como artículo en American Economic Review 100(4): 1860-1874 (2010).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1860
Publisher version (URL)http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2008/75708.pdf
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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