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Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

AutorCalsamiglia, Caterina; Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip
Palabras claveSchool choice
Matching
Experiment
Gale-Shapley
Top trading cycles
Boston mechanism
Efficiency
Stability
Truncation
Truthtelling
Safety school
Fecha de publicación17-nov-2008
SerieUFAE and IAE Working Papers ; 757.08
ResumenThe literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferences. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools play an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy.
Descripción31 pages, 18 tables.-- JEL classification: C72, C78, D78, I20.-- Trabajo publicado como artículo en American Economic Review 100(4): 1860-1874 (2010).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1860
Versión del editorhttp://pareto.uab.es/wp/2008/75708.pdf
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/10530
Aparece en las colecciones: (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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