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http://hdl.handle.net/10261/10526
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Title: | Leadership in Collective Action |
Authors: | Esteban, Joan ![]() ![]() |
Keywords: | Collective contests Leadership Group platform Incentives Sharing rules |
Issue Date: | 13-Oct-2008 |
Series: | UFAE and IAE Working Papers ; 756.08 |
Abstract: | We extend the model of collective action in which groups compete for a budged by endogenizing the group platform, namely the specific mixture of public/private good and the distribution of the private good to group members which can be uniform or performance-based. While the group-optimal platform contains a degree of publicness that increases in group size and divides the private benefits uniformly, a success-maximizing leader uses incentives and distorts the platform towards more private benefits - a distortion that increases with group size. In both settings we obtain the anti-Olson type result that win probability increases with group size. |
Description: | 32 pages.-- JEL-Classification: D70, D72, D74. |
Publisher version (URL): | http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2008/75608.pdf |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/10526 |
Appears in Collections: | (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo |
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