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Title

Leadership in Collective Action

AuthorsEsteban, Joan ; Hauk, Esther
KeywordsCollective contests
Leadership
Group platform
Incentives
Sharing rules
Issue Date13-Oct-2008
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers ; 756.08
AbstractWe extend the model of collective action in which groups compete for a budged by endogenizing the group platform, namely the specific mixture of public/private good and the distribution of the private good to group members which can be uniform or performance-based. While the group-optimal platform contains a degree of publicness that increases in group size and divides the private benefits uniformly, a success-maximizing leader uses incentives and distorts the platform towards more private benefits - a distortion that increases with group size. In both settings we obtain the anti-Olson type result that win probability increases with group size.
Description32 pages.-- JEL-Classification: D70, D72, D74.
Publisher version (URL)http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2008/75608.pdf
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/10526
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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