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Preferred Suppliers in Auction Markets

AuthorsBurguet, Roberto ; Perry, Martin K.
KeywordsProcurement auctions
Bilateral agreements
Issue Date15-Jul-2008
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers ; 752.08
AbstractIn a procurement setting, this paper examines agreements between a buyer and one of the suppliers which would increase their joint surplus. The provisions of such agreements depend on the buyer's ability to design the rules of the final procurement auction. When the buyer has no such ability, their joint surplus can be increased by an agreement which grants to the preferred supplier a right-of-first-refusal on the lowest price offer from the other suppliers. When the buyer does have this ability, one agreement which maximizes their joint surplus includes a revelation game for the cost of the preferred supplier and a reserve price in the procurement auction based on that cost.
Description23 pages.-- JEL Classification: D44, D82, C79.-- Trabajo publicado como artículo en RAND Journal of Economics 40(2): 283-295 (2009).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00065.x
Publisher version (URL)http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2008/75208.pdf
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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