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dc.contributor.authorAzagra Caro, Joaquín-
dc.contributor.authorAznar Márquez, J.-
dc.contributor.authorBlanco, Juan M.-
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-05T09:02:44Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-05T09:02:44Z-
dc.date.issued2005-07-06-
dc.identifier.citationR & D Management Conference. 6-8 Julio 2005, Pisa (Italia)en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/10316-
dc.description8 pages, 4 tablesen_US
dc.description.abstractWe develop a model of individual choice in which faculty member is the rational agent and maximises a utility function. We find an interior optimum of interactive effort that depends on parameters of the utility function, wage, net revenue from a unit of knowledge produced by interactive activities, relative weight given to interactive vs. non-interactive activities in the determination of prestige and knowledge contribution by unit of time allocated to each activity. The model is tested by using a sample of 380 university professors from the Valencian Community, a Spanish region. We use censored and discrete choice econometric models to estimate an equation for the optimum effort allocated to interactive activities and another one for the real interaction. We conclude, first, that interaction activities could be explained by a maximising utility model and that individual responds to non-monetary rather than monetary incentives and to the difficulty of producing non-interactive rather than interactive knowledge. Second, we detect the possible existence of rationing, since optimum effort and real interaction depend on different variables. This is possibly an idiosyncrasy of our sample, coming from a region with low absorptive capacity. Policy initiatives may see the promotion (or disincentive) of university-industry interaction as a mediumlong term target rather than a short-term one and may be aware of situations arising from rationing.en_US
dc.format.extent151039 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsopenAccessen_US
dc.titleThe allocation of effort to university- industry interactive activities by faculty members: a theoretical and empirical approachen_US
dc.typecomunicación de congresoen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer revieweden_US
Appears in Collections:(INGENIO) Comunicaciones congresos
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