2024-03-29T06:06:39Zhttp://digital.csic.es/dspace-oai/requestoai:digital.csic.es:10261/581222019-03-25T14:33:38Zcom_10261_58com_10261_7col_10261_311
Optimal seigniorage and financial liberalization
Bacchetta, Philippe
Caminal, Ramón
This paper analyzes the effect of financial integration for countries relying on the taxation of their domestic financial system. A two-country model with overlapping generations and explicit financial intermediation is used. Goverments derive revenues from seigniorage and set optimally, but non-cooperatively, the rate of inflation and the level of required reserves on bank deposits. A financial liberalizations leads to lower reserve ratios, higher inflation rates, and larger stocks of government debt. When the liberalization is anticipated, governments may temporarily increase the reserve ratios before the liberalization occurs. (JEL F30, E60). © 1992.
2012-10-16T11:27:20Z
2012-10-16T11:27:20Z
1992
2012-10-16T11:27:21Z
artículo
Journal of International Money and Finance 11(6): 518-538 (1992)
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/58122
10.1016/0261-5606(92)90001-E
eng
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0261-5606(92)90001-E
closedAccess
Elsevier