2024-03-30T03:30:00Zhttp://digital.csic.es/dspace-oai/requestoai:digital.csic.es:10261/583722016-02-17T10:46:03Zcom_10261_58com_10261_7col_10261_311
Strategic bargaining with firm inventories
Coles, Melvin G.
Smith, E.
This paper characterizes how a firm's opportunity to sell from its stock of inventories affects the outcome of strategic wage negotiations with a union of workers. In equilibrium, the union and firm share the benefits from an immediate return to work less the costs of a strike of infinite duration. This outcome is equivalent to a Nash bargaining solution in which the threat points are the agents' expected payoffs should a strike last forever. We also demonstrate that for a given level of inventories, the wage increases when demand is high. Conversely, given demand, the wage falls as inventories rise.
The authors would like to thank the UK Department of Employment, the Leverhulme Trust and La Comision Interministerial de Ciencia y Tecnologia for Þnancial support.
Peer Reviewed
2012-10-18T10:51:38Z
2012-10-18T10:51:38Z
1998
2012-10-18T10:51:38Z
artículo
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
doi: 10.1016/S0165-1889(97)00108-5
issn: 0165-1889
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 23(1): 35-54 (1998)
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/58372
10.1016/S0165-1889(97)00108-5
en
none
Elsevier