2024-03-28T14:51:49Zhttp://digital.csic.es/dspace-oai/requestoai:digital.csic.es:10261/573942019-03-25T14:33:38Zcom_10261_58com_10261_7col_10261_311
Caminal, Ramón
Claici, Adina
2012-10-05T11:42:44Z
2012-10-05T11:42:44Z
2007
International Journal of Industrial Organization 25(4): 657- 674 (2007)
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57394
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.07.004
Many economists and policy analysts seem to believe that loyalty-rewarding pricing schemes, like frequent flyer programs, tend to reinforce firms' market power and hence are detrimental to consumer welfare. The existing academic literature has supported this view to some extent. In contrast, we argue that these programs are business stealing devices that tend to enhance competition, in the sense of generating lower average transaction prices and higher consumer surplus. In highly competitive environments this result is robust to alternative specifications of the firm' commitment power and demand structures. However, it could be reversed if the number of firms is sufficiently small and if firms are restricted to use program designs with sufficiently weak commitment capacity. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
eng
openAccess
Are loyalty-rewarding pricing schemes anti-competitive?
artículo