2024-03-29T04:56:20Zhttp://digital.csic.es/dspace-oai/requestoai:digital.csic.es:10261/19552016-02-16T02:09:29Zcom_10261_58com_10261_7col_10261_689
Massó, Jordi
Neme, Alejandro
2007-11-08T15:35:47Z
2007-11-08T15:35:47Z
1999-03
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1955
The consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result.
eng
openAccess
Division problem
Maximal Domain Of Preferences In The Division Problem
documento de trabajo