2019-01-24T07:41:22Z
https://digital.csic.es/dspace-oai/request
oai:digital.csic.es:10261/14105
2016-05-06T09:55:08Z
com_10261_10
com_10261_7
col_10261_389
Peña, Lorenzo
2009-06-30T07:52:06Z
2009-06-30T07:52:06Z
1993-01
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/14105
The negative approach to a theory of rationality is
primarily concerned with rejecting what is irrational,
which usually is equated with what is inconsistent. The
positive approach tries to enhance patterns of reasoning
practice. Different sorts of consistency and
inconsistency are by no means equivalent. What is
anyway required is positive reasoning. So, I
espouse the positive view: to reason is to infer, and since
inference is relative, so is reasoning. As an approximation
to deductive reasoning, I sketch a system of logic close
enough to the most widely publicized relevant system of
entailment logic. Reasoning as thus implemented is of course
somehow artificial. Some part of the remaining task can
be afforded by a pragmatic rounding out of purely inferential logic.
eng
openAccess
Teoría de la racionalidad
Lógica del entrañamiento
Lógica relevante
Theory of rationality
Entailment logic
Relevant logic
Is Reasoning the Same as Relevant Inference?
Comunicación de congreso