2024-03-29T09:52:12Zhttp://digital.csic.es/dspace-oai/requestoai:digital.csic.es:10261/1397692018-08-02T10:34:05Zcom_10261_60com_10261_4col_10261_313
DIGITAL.CSIC
author
Perreau de Pinninck, Adrian
author
Sierra, Carles
author
Schorlemmer, Marco
funder
European Commission
funder
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (España)
funder
Generalitat de Catalunya
2016-11-02T16:51:36Z
2016-11-02T16:51:36Z
2010
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 21: 397- 424 (2010)
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/139769
10.1007/s10458-009-9107-8
http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003339http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000780http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100002809
In a multiagent system where norms are used to regulate the actions agents ought to execute, some agents may decide not to abide by the norms if this can benefit them. Norm enforcement mechanisms are designed to counteract these benefits and thus the motives for not abiding by the norms. In this work we propose a distributed mechanism through which agents in the multiagent system that do not abide by the norms can be ostracised by their peers. An ostracised agent cannot interact anymore and looses all benefits from future interactions. We describe a model for multiagent systems structured as networks of agents, and a behavioural model for the agents in such systems. Furthermore, we provide analytical results which show that there exists an upper bound to the number of potential norm violations when all the agents exhibit certain behaviours. We also provide experimental results showing that both stricter enforcement behaviours and larger percentage of agents exhibiting these behaviours reduce the number of norm violations, and that the network topology influences the number of norm violations. These experiments have been executed under varying scenarios with different values for the number of agents, percentage of enforcers, percentage of violators, network topology, and agent behaviours. Finally, we give examples of applications where the enforcement techniques we provide could be used. © The Author(s) 2009.
eng
openAccess
Social network
Ostracism
Enforcement
Multiagent systems
Norms
A multiagent network for peer norm enforcement
artículo
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URL
https://digital.csic.es/bitstream/10261/139769/1/AAMAS_21%283%292010_397-424.pdf
File
MD5
fb9debce1fb983664cdd71325f3c462a
342970
application/pdf
AAMAS_21(3)2010_397-424.pdf