2024-03-28T08:27:01Zhttp://digital.csic.es/dspace-oai/requestoai:digital.csic.es:10261/584902019-03-26T11:20:21Zcom_10261_58com_10261_7col_10261_311
00925njm 22002777a 4500
dc
Ponsatí, Clara
author
Sákovics, József
author
1995
We present a continuous-time model of the war of attrition with exponential discounting and with two-sided incomplete information. We provide a full characterization of the Bayesian Equilibria of this game, without restricting strategies to be differentiable. © 1995.
Mathematical Social Science 29(3): 239-254 (1995)
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/58490
10.1016/0165-4896(94)00771-Y
The war of attrition with incomplete information