2024-03-28T11:39:30Zhttp://digital.csic.es/dspace-oai/requestoai:digital.csic.es:10261/21062016-02-16T02:11:07Zcom_10261_102com_10261_7col_10261_733
2007-11-14T08:46:22Z
urn:hdl:10261/2106
How do subjects assess the Social Trade-off invilved in the Prisoners' Dilemma?
Brañas-Garza, Pablo
Morales, Antonio J.
Prisoner's dilemma
Payment cards
Social conflict
A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Revisiting Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma”.
In this paper we obtain the value that experimental subjects attach to a prisoners’ dilemma game by applying a related procedure to BDM (1964). We also obtain the value of a closely related game
which does not incorporate any social dilemma. By comparing both values, we are able to classify subjects in different categories: (i) 16% of the subjects responded to the social dilemma by playing the cooperative strategy, (ii) The remaining subjects (84%) did not played the
cooperative strategy and moreover, 53% of the subjects behaved as if the social dilemma was not an issue at all.
2007-11-14T08:46:22Z
2007-11-14T08:46:22Z
2004-05-05
documento de trabajo
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/2106
eng
IESA Working Paper Series
WP 07-04
openAccess