2024-03-29T04:57:39Zhttp://digital.csic.es/dspace-oai/requestoai:digital.csic.es:10261/19522016-02-16T02:09:26Zcom_10261_58com_10261_7col_10261_689
2007-11-08T15:22:57Z
urn:hdl:10261/1952
Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value
PĂ©rez-Castrillo, David
Wettstein, David
Shapley value
Implementation
Simple mechanism
Coalition formation
We propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility. The mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We show that the
subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the Shapley value payoffs. We extend our results to implement the weighted Shapley values. Finally, we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility environments. The modified mechanism generates an efficient coalition structure, and implements the Shapley values of the super-additive cover of the environment.
2007-11-08T15:22:57Z
2007-11-08T15:22:57Z
2000-06
documento de trabajo
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1952
eng
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
461.00
openAccess