2024-03-29T11:10:59Zhttp://digital.csic.es/dspace-oai/requestoai:digital.csic.es:10261/18462016-02-16T02:03:13Zcom_10261_58com_10261_7col_10261_689
2007-11-05T14:42:12Z
urn:hdl:10261/1846
On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
MartÃnez, Ruth
Massó, Jordi
Neme, Alejandro
Oviedo, Jorge
Matching
Stability
Strategy-proofness
For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.
2007-11-05T14:42:12Z
2007-11-05T14:42:12Z
2003-05-16
documento de trabajo
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1846
eng
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
577.03
openAccess