2024-03-29T05:27:28Zhttp://digital.csic.es/dspace-oai/requestoai:digital.csic.es:10261/1123612019-03-25T14:33:38Zcom_10261_58com_10261_7col_10261_689
2015-03-13T12:55:48Z
urn:hdl:10261/112361
Bargaining Failures and Merger Policy
Burguet, Roberto
Caminal, Ramón
Publicado como: Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series nº 633. Barcelona: Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, 2014
Comunicación presentada en la Competition and Regulation European Summer School and Conference (CRESSE 2013), 8th International Conference on Competition and Regulation, celebrada del 5 al 7 de julio de 2013 en Corfu (Grecia)
We study approval rules in a model where horizontal merger proposals arise endogenously as the outcome of negotiations among the Örms in the industry. We make two main points. First, relatively ine¢ cient merger proposals succeed with positive probability. That is, the negotiation process may result in a particular merger agreement despite the existence of an alternative one that would generate higher proÖts and higher consumer surplus. Second, the antitrust authority should optimally commit to an approval rule that is more stringent for all mergers than the optimal ex-post rule
2015-03-13T12:55:48Z
2015-03-13T12:55:48Z
2013-07-05
2015-03-13T12:55:48Z
documento de trabajo
Competition and Regulation European Summer School and Conference (CRESSE 2013)
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/112361
eng
openAccess