2024-03-28T11:56:15Zhttp://digital.csic.es/dspace-oai/requestoai:digital.csic.es:10261/1751652019-03-26T12:18:33Zcom_10261_58com_10261_7col_10261_311
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/175165
10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.008
354977
Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining
Elsevier
2016
artículo
Nunnari, Salvatore
Zapal, Jan
rp11171
Legislative bargaining
Experiments
Quantal response
Gambler's fallacy
2016-09
We investigate the implications of imperfect best response—in combination with different assumptions about correct (QRE) or incorrect beliefs (Quantal-Gambler's Fallacy or QGF)—in the alternating offer multilateral bargaining game. We prove that a QRE of this game exists and characterize the unique solution to the proposer's problem—that is, the proposal observed most frequently in a QRE. We structurally estimate this model on data from laboratory experiments, and show that it explains behavior better than the model with perfect best response: receivers vote probabilistically; proposers allocate resources mostly within a minimum winning coalition of legislators but do not fully exploit their bargaining power. Incorporating history-dependent beliefs about the future distribution of proposal power into the QRE model (QGF) leads to an even better match with the data, as this model implies slightly lower shares to the proposer, maintaining similar or higher frequencies of minimum winning coalitions and similar voting behavior.
Czech Science Foundation
Games and Economic Behavior
2016
99
275
294