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ID: 353659 - A selfish allocation heuristic in scheduling: Equilibrium and inefficiency bound analysis
|
420
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ID: 9702 - Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study
|
410
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ID: 456 - Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching
|
388
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ID: 46731 - A comment on "School choice: An experimental study" [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]
|
380
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ID: 339 - Constrained School Choice
|
372
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ID: 60162 - Farsighted stability for roommate markets
|
368
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ID: 60887 - Stable matchings and preferences of couples
|
368
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ID: 404 - Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples
|
366
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ID: 474 - Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
|
362
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ID: 36246 - Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests
|
359
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ID: 46859 - Farsighted house allocation
|
358
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ID: 60567 - On the convexity of precedence sequencing games
|
355
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ID: 302 - Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples [Revised Version]
|
351
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ID: 61087 - Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint
|
348
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ID: 399 - Sequencing Games without Initial Order
|
344
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ID: 389 - Corrigendum to ''On Randomized Matching Mechanisms'' [Economic Theory 8(1996) 377-381]
|
342
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|
ID: 418 - Distribution Center Consolidation Games
|
342
|
|
ID: 473 - On Games corresponding to Sequencing Situations with Precedence Relations
|
339
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|
ID: 429 - Manipulation of Optimal Matchings via Predonation of Endowment
|
338
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ID: 47003 - Stochastic stability for roommate markets
|
330
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ID: 36442 - Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement
|
328
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ID: 50911 - Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
|
328
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ID: 304614 - On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets
|
323
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ID: 304678 - Local and global consistency properties for student placement
|
319
|
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ID: 50912 - On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable
|
317
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ID: 304 - Smith and Rawls Share a Room
|
312
|
|
ID: 378 - Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples
|
310
|
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ID: 322033 - Outsourcing with identical suppliers and shortest-first policy: a laboratory experiment
|
308
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ID: 390 - Employment by Lotto Revisited
|
305
|
|
ID: 395 - A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects
|
305
|
|
ID: 36135 - Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment
|
304
|
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ID: 304674 - Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
|
298
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ID: 355090 - Balanced exchange in a multi-object shapley-scarf market
|
298
|
|
ID: 304637 - Matching with couples: A multidisciplinary survey
|
294
|
|
ID: 304554 - A many-to-many 'rural hospital theorem'
|
293
|
|
ID: 385 - Median Stable Matching for College Admission
|
292
|
|
ID: 304558 - Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint
|
290
|
|
ID: 304694 - Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: A laboratory experiment
|
288
|
|
ID: 321 - The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002)
|
282
|
|
ID: 38493 - A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem'
|
280
|
|
ID: 347058 - Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability
|
278
|
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ID: 312486 - Affirmative action through minority reserves: An experimental study on school choice
|
277
|
|
ID: 347056 - Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists
|
274
|
|
ID: 309011 - A Many-to-Many Rural Hospital Theorem
|
255
|
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ID: 385870 - Improving schools through school choice: An experimental study of deferred acceptance
|
248
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ID: 355140 - Circulation under responsive preferences
|
222
|
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ID: 382396 - The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs
|
217
|
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ID: 355138 - Circulation under responsive preferences
|
215
|
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ID: 382393 - Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment
|
212
|
|
ID: 382318 - Constrained allocation of projects to heterogeneous workers with preferences over peers
|
195
|
|
ID: 309008 - Affirmative Action through Minority Reserves: An Experimental Study on School Choice
|
192
|
|
ID: 355141 - Circulation under responsive preferences
|
186
|
|
ID: 382338 - Implementation of optimal schedules in outsourcing with identical suppliers
|
185
|
|
ID: 432906 - School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms
|
100
|
|
ID: 464286 - Academic integrity in on-line exams: Evidence from a randomized field experiment
|
47
|
|
ID: 480996 - Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market
|
43
|
|
ID: 435813 - Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core
|
39
|
|
ID: 498053 - Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Games with Friend-Oriented Preferences
|
34
|
|
ID: 435977 - Balanced Exchange in a Multi-Object ShapleyScarf Marke
|
33
|
|
ID: 435936 - Almost Mutually Best in Matching Markets: Rank-Fairness and Size of the Core
|
23
|
|
ID: 435937 - Almost Mutually Best in Matching Markets: Rank-Fairness and Size of the Core
|
21
|
|
ID: 538779 - Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis
|
21
|
|
ID: 446555 - Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange
|
20
|
|
ID: 435979 - Balanced Exchange in a Multi-Object Shapley-Scarf Market
|
18
|
|
ID: 446566 - Walk-Zone Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism
|
15
|
|
ID: 498060 - Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Games with Friend-Oriented Preferences
|
15
|
|
ID: 446574 - Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange
|
14
|
|
ID: 498046 - Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Games with Friend-Oriented Preferences
|
14
|
|
ID: 498045 - Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Games with Friend-Oriented Preferences
|
13
|
|
ID: 498057 - Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Games with Friend-Oriented Preferences
|
8
|
|
ID: 552706 - A Characterization of the Coordinate-Wise Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets
|
8
|
|
ID: 552743 - Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Coalition Formation Problems with Friend-Oriented Preferences
|
4
|
|
ID: 552744 - Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Coalition Formation Problems with Friend-Oriented Preferences
|
2
|
|
ID: 552809 - Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism
|
2
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