


EDITED BY  
WILLEM FLOOR AND EDMUND HERZIG



IRAN AND THE WORLD  
IN THE SAFAVID AGE

I.B. TAURIS



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*Edited by*

*Willem Floor  
and  
Edmund Herzig*

**I.B. TAURIS**

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
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# The Holy See, the Spanish Monarchy and Safavid Persia in the Sixteenth Century: Some Aspects of the Involvement of the Society of Jesus

*Enrique García Hernán*

## *Introduction*

This chapter intends to analyse the diplomatic efforts of the Holy See and Spain to achieve a Persian alliance in their common fight against the Turks, particularly during the pontificates of Pius V, Gregory XIII and Clement VIII. The confrontation between Persia and the Ottoman Empire was perceived by the Catholic monarchy and the papacy as the best opportunity for the Persian Safavid dynasty to become a faithful ally despite their different religions. We shall concentrate mainly on the diplomatic activity of three Jesuits, Francis Borgia, Matías Bicudo and Francisco de Acosta. This new religious order was capable of serving both the Hispanic monarchy and the Holy See at the same time. The three of them were supporters of a determined military involvement. The Holy See would face numerous difficulties in its attempt to establish an efficient apostolic activity and fluid diplomatic relations. However, polarized positions and divisions among the religious orders would prove an insurmountable problem. We shall use mostly unpublished documentation from the General Archives of Simancas.

Shah Esmá'il I (1500–24), who since 1510 had extended his dominion to all of Iran, Mesopotamia and Armenia so that it bordered the Ottoman Empire, realized the need to create an alliance with the European Christian powers to oppose the Ottomans. Charles V also analysed this possible alliance and was the first to take the initiative and, in his capacity as emperor of Germany, he contacted Esmá'il in the decade of 1520 to find channels of cooperation. As a response to this approach, Shah Tahmasp sent him a letter in 1523 in which he expressed his hope that both armies would join to overcome the Ottomans. Thus, in the context of the international



strategy of the Hispanic monarchs and of the Pontiffs, Persia was turning into a possible ally that, from a strategic point of view, presented the possibility of attacking the common Ottoman enemy on two fronts.

Later on, in 1566, emperors Maximilian II and Philip II decided to send an embassy to Shah Tahmasp offering friendship and alliance. Both needed the cooperation of the king of Portugal, don Sebastian, who was in contact with the king of Persia through the viceroy of India and the captain of Hormuz. In the cosmopolitan Portuguese city of Hormuz (1507–1622) Persians, Turks, Arabs, Armenians, Abyssinians, Indians, Chinese, Portuguese, Muslims, Jews, Christians and Hindus and other nationalities and religious communities met and mingled.<sup>1</sup> The Holy See was aware of what was going on there thanks to the Jesuits. The Dutch Gaspar Berze (1515–53) resided there for several years from 1549 to 1551. Francisco sent him to Hormuz with the duty of staying there, a true crossroads of the Orient, for at least three years. He observed that in Hormuz illicit arms traffic with Moors and Turks was taking place. This was prohibited by the Bull *In Coena Domini*, which sanctioned with excommunication the sale of arms, steel and sulphur to the ‘enemies of faith’. The sulphur originated in Persia across the straights from the city of Hormuz. The orders of the Bull could be dispensed with under special circumstances. However, the Jews, true traders of weapons and other military goods, could act as intermediaries since as non-Christians they were not affected by excommunication. In Hormuz there were many Hispanic Jews, for the most part new Christians from Spain and Portugal who, coming through Venice, had arrived in the Persian Gulf and had regained the faith of their ancestors.

Father Berze saw that Hormuz had little apostolic success and therefore wished to go to Persia. As a matter of fact, he had thought of writing to Shah Tahmasp a detailed report about the mistakes of the Islamic religion and to beg him to send some of his doctors of divinity (i.e. *faqih*s) to Hormuz to have a conversation with him about their faiths. If Francisco Javier authorized him, he was prepared to go to Persia. Berze shared the general opinion with the Persians that the Christian princes demonstrated unjustifiable weakness in their reluctance to fight the Turks.

Around 1550 Berze had a public dispute with a Muslim philosopher of Persia, ambassador Ceide Maduny, who, coming from Chaul in an embassy from India, had arrived in Hormuz. Berze achieved the conversion of his wife and daughter. He also succeeded in sending a Portuguese embassy to Persia to renew the mutual alliance, despite the incident with Ceide Maduny, because the shah needed Portuguese artillery and arms in his fight against the Turks. One of the manners and customs that most amazed Berze was that the Persians considered the shah a god. He remarked with surprise that: ‘the water with which he washes his feet they all use as relics to cure all sicknesses’.<sup>2</sup> Despite all efforts, there was no significant success and the provincial of India ruled that there should be a different priest in Hormuz every year given the unhealthiness of the place and the few apostolic results obtained. In spite of this ruling, the Society of Jesus would obtain privileged information about the situation in Hormuz.<sup>3</sup>

From the political perspective, the Persian alliance continued to be important for the Christian princes. In 1567 Philip II asked his ambassador in Lisbon to send him a detailed report about the best way to reach Persia, the personal qualities a potential ambassador might require, the emoluments of the ambassadors of the king of Portugal to that court, how to behave towards the shah, the language in which to write and the presents most valued by the Persians. The king wished to send an embassy together with the ambassador. This mission reached Lisbon too late, after the vessels departing for India that year had already set sail.<sup>4</sup> Another significant moment was in 1572, when on the occasion of the victory at Lepanto, the Holy See, Venice, Spain and Portugal sent emissaries to the king of Abyssinia and to the sovereigns of Arabia Felix and the Arabian border with Syria to encourage attacks on the Turks.<sup>5</sup>

In the same way as the Spanish monarchs tried to create a network of alliances with the enemies of the Sublime Port to mitigate their desire for conquest in the West, the Persians pursued the support of the Christian monarchs to hold back Ottoman advances in the East. Therefore, during the sixteenth century the Hispanic monarchy tried to create a stable alliance with those rulers who could serve this purpose, providing funds or sending emissaries to the Balkan peninsula, the north of Africa and oriental Europe and, of course, to Persia.<sup>6</sup> The viceroy of Portugal would recognize in 1601 that Philip II had always wished to stay in diplomatic contact with Persia with the sole purpose of establishing an alliance against the Turkish Empire.<sup>7</sup> In this sense, Spain and the Holy See could support each other to achieve the same objectives.

### *The pontificate of Pius V (1566-72)*

The apostolic see started to favour requesting the cooperation of the Persians during the pontificate of Pius V, who had started a great offensive against the Turks by means of the Holy League (1571-3), a Hispanic-Venetian pontifical confederation, formed with the aim of regaining Jerusalem by any means.<sup>8</sup> After lengthy and complex diplomatic, legal and military negotiations, the three states became confederated to oppose the Ottomans under Selim II (1566-74). On the same day on which the most celebrated Holy League was signed, the Pope decided on his own initiative, without the counsel of his cardinals, to send apostolic legates to Spain and Germany. The Pope's nephew, Cardinal Alexandrine, was to visit Philip II, while Maximilian II would receive a visit from Cardinal Commendome.

The Alexandrine legate was also to visit Portugal and, depending on circumstances, France as well, as turned out to be the case. One of the aspects of the instructions - very zealously protected - linked Alexandrine with a person who was internationally admired, particularly in Spain. The Pope instructed his nephew that, as far as Portugal was concerned, he should follow the lead of the Jesuits' General, Father Francis Borgia; furthermore, he was plainly telling him that he was to converse

with him about everything, to follow his advice and that he should only meet those whom Borgia specified.<sup>9</sup> Borgia was brought into the Pope's ambitious plan to unite Christendom, to put an end to heresy, to restrain the Turkish advance and to expand Christendom throughout the world. Borgia was a key element in the pontifical governance system. His capacity as general of the Jesuits, his privileged position as former Duke of Gandía and, most particularly, his personal talents made him appear as particularly useful to serve the pontificate in particularly difficult missions.

Although initially some churchmen proposed that legates be sent to the Protestant princes to persuade them to cooperate in the fight against the Turks, the Pope very energetically opposed this: 'nullam concordiam vel pacem debere nec posse esse inter nos et hereticos' the council solemnly declared on 23 June 1571. The Pope was not inclined to ask the Lutherans and Calvinists for help, rather he was counting on help from the shah of Persia. As soon as the victory of Lepanto was known, he did not hesitate to request the shah's assistance.<sup>10</sup> It was possibly the Portuguese Jesuit priest Matías Bicudo (Matías Furtado Bigudo) who inspired Pius V with the idea of requesting the cooperation of Persia since for several years Bicudo had resided in the Orient serving the Portuguese kings, and he knew the atmosphere and was now close to the Pope. Nevertheless, there are numerous unanswered questions about this individual, who appears to have belonged to a number of religious orders. It is difficult to be certain about his true activities for he was a shadowy figure to his contemporaries and has remained so for historians.<sup>11</sup>

There are also doubts as to the real intentions of Pius V for, when the Spanish ambassador to Rome mentioned the Persian cooperation, he responded that he did not wish to write to Persia since it was not customary for the popes to relate to infidels. Philip took this to be a great contradiction and thought the Pope had forgotten that the negotiations had already been opened; this explains the king's reaction: '[His Holiness] must not have remembered', he wrote to his ambassador in Rome. The King already had in his possession the original pontifical document remitted to the shah.<sup>12</sup>

In those documents Pius V narrated to the shah the victory of Lepanto and encouraged him to take advantage of the favourable military circumstance and to raise an army to invade the enemy territory to make up for the losses his nation had suffered with the territories stolen from his ancestors by Suleiman in the regions of Mesopotamia and Syria. The pontifical chancellery was ignorant of the real situation in Persia, as the losses referred to in the document had occurred during the reign of Tahmasp I, in 1534, and not in that of his predecessors.<sup>13</sup>

One of the objectives of Francis Borgia in Portugal had been to persuade King Sebastian to second the strategic plans of Pius V.

From Lisbon he directly informed his friend the *condottiere* Marco Antonio Colonna, admiral of the pontifical fleet, who had succeeded in securing the entry of the Portuguese king into the Holy League by offering his military assistance. Furthermore, the Portuguese would attack the Turks not only from the Red Sea, but also from Persia and Ethiopia.<sup>14</sup> Marco Antonio Colonna was thankful for the

Portuguese help for a future military campaign in Persia but asked Philip II – thus following the pontifical plans – to do anything possible to regain Constantinople, which was the main objective.<sup>15</sup> One must bear in mind that in December 1571 the king informed his ambassador in Rome to contrive the diplomacy to obtain Persia's cooperation. Thus, from Madrid, Lisbon, Rome, Venice and Messina, where the allied fleet was, all set to work to obtain the shah's cooperation.<sup>16</sup>

No sooner had he left Madrid, than the Alexandrine legate entrusted to the nuncio at the Spanish court, Castagna, some matters pertaining to Persia, five apostolic briefs and a letter for King don Sebastian of Portugal. They were sent to the pontifical collector in Lisbon, monsignor Aspra. The aim was to pursue the initiative of the allies, to persuade Persia, 'Ethiopia' and 'Arabia' to declare war on the Turks. For this purpose they could count on the help promised by King Sebastian, taking into account the many contacts he had with the allies due to the frequency of Portuguese voyages and travels. Aspra had to translate the apostolic briefs into the languages of their consignees.<sup>17</sup> King Sebastian accepted the proposals and sent a special ambassador to Persia with the letters from the Pope, the doge from Venice and the Catholic king.<sup>18</sup> Translating the apostolic briefs and documents into Persian was no easy task. Certainly there were Portuguese who spoke Persian, but they were usually not in Lisbon and for that reason it was decided eventually that an Armenian would translate them when they reached Hormuz.<sup>19</sup>

The man chosen to take the documents to Persia was don Miguel de Abreu, a Portuguese noble who had lived in India for many years. He would embark in one of the vessels that were to leave Lisbon in the month of March. In the instructions for Abreu, the king of Portugal ordered that, for the sake of all, he was to convince the shah to attack the Turks immediately since, further to the victory of Lepanto, the Christian allies would continue their fight in new fronts. The emperor and Poland would attack from Hungary, and the king of Portugal from India. Now a new front needed to be opened from the Red Sea and from Hormuz to cause the greatest damage possible and, as the instruction mentioned, 'que le faça toda la guerra que poder sea' (to wage war with all means available). Portuguese India had no doubts that it would so be done. The aim was to achieve on all possible fronts the total destruction of the Turks: 'sua total destruição'. The Christian princes were certain that they would find an ally in the shah with whom they would have friendship and trade.<sup>20</sup> Abreu would first travel to Goa, the Portuguese capital in India, from where the viceroy would grant him everything needed to continue his journey to Hormuz and from there to Persia.

It is true that King Sebastian was prepared to participate in the league against the Turks and to enter the war for Asia and the Red Sea by sending an army supported by Abyssinians, Arabs and Egyptians. He had ordered the readying of a great army of 4,000 men to support the Holy League in those territories. But before they embarked on this military adventure the king wanted the Dutch Calvinists who threatened his dominions to be neutralized. He knew that nearly 70 vessels were being prepared to attack the Portuguese in Brazil. Aside from the question of how to respond to the

Calvinist mobilization, doubts remained about whether it was strategically advisable to send 4,000 men to Asia. Some argued that it would be better to maximize the resources available to the Holy League and to direct all available forces to an attack on the very heart of the Ottoman Empire. The Venetian ambassador Tiepolo reasoned that these men would be better employed in the Mediterranean, rather than in such far away places, and therefore he requested the Portuguese authorities to indicate exactly the number of soldiers they would send 'non nelle parte delle Indie, ma delle parte d'Europa' (not from India but from Europe).<sup>22</sup> Don Sebastian decided that, for Christendom, the best he could send was 6,000 men to Asia, that it would be of little benefit for the league to send a reduced army to the Mediterranean. Don Juan of Austria, captain general of the allied forces of the Holy League, was also in favour of King Sebastian sending his army to Asia because the 2,000 soldiers, at the most, for the Mediterranean front would be nothing compared with the 6,000 who would come from Asia. Thereafter the Arabs and Persians would revolt little by little at the sight of Portuguese troops.<sup>23</sup>

The pontifical documents arrived in the hands of the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon – don Juan Borgia (son of Francis Borgia) – 12 hours after the vessels heading to India set sail from the port of Lisbon, early in the morning of 18 March 1572. All the diplomatic efforts seemed to have been in vain. However, several moves were made to ensure that those documents reached the hands of their cosignatories via the ambassadors. There is no evidence of how this was achieved, although there is a certain amount of information suggesting that the mission was successful.

On his side, Jesuit Matías Bicudo endeavoured on all possible fronts to ensure that Christian forces allied themselves with the Persians to attack the Ottomans. It is known that in 1571 he had already proposed to the viceroy of Sicily the establishment of negotiations with a distinguished gentleman of Cairo.<sup>24</sup> The proposal was successful because don Juan of Austria communicated to the king that he had sent to Egypt two spies that Bicudo had recommended.<sup>25</sup> At that time the Society of Jesus had already had several important apostolic missions in those territories. The first Jesuits in Egypt, Miguel de Nóbrega (1552–3) and Fulgencio Freire (1560–3), lived like slaves. Between 1561 and 1564 fathers Cristóbal Rodríguez and Giovanni Battista Eliano remained in Egypt as apostolic legates to the Coptic patriarch Gabriel VII with the intention of achieving unification between the Coptic and Roman churches. Bicudo was aware of these moves and envisaged a possible Coptic alliance in their fight against the Turks. We have no more news about the spies sent by Juan de Austria but there are records showing that one decade later the new patriarch, John XIV, was more inclined towards the union, hence Gregory XIII sent a new mission between 1582 and 1584 with expert Jesuits, fathers Francesco Sasso and Giovanni Battista Eliano. Although the Council of Menfis took place, it ended in controversy and failure, with the imprisonment of the Jesuits on 21 September 1584. They were released the following year.

While the Holy League lasted (1571–3) the Spanish politicians realized the need for the shah and other princes to join the confederation. It is possible that similar letters were sent to the duke of Moscow, to the king of Poland and to the Christian

provinces of the Black Sea. Don Juan of Austria, at least, wrote to this effect to the Christians of Rhodes seeking the alliance of the Greeks of Maina.<sup>26</sup>

It is also known that in Rome Cardinal Amulio, Venetian ambassador to the Holy See, had an understanding with Matías Bicudo that was starting to raise suspicions amongst the Spaniards. He had planned an almost perfect scheme to seize Alexandria. The idea was also presented to the Spanish Cardinal Gaspar de Quiroga who, in turn, presented it to Philip II. No sooner had the sovereign heard the plan than he openly endorsed it. The king had personally seen the Portuguese Father Bicudo and believed he was trustworthy and, although he could not make a final decision about the proposal, Bicudo was right in what concerned the purposes of the enemy army and therefore he had to be taken into account for missions in the Orient. Philip II was in favour of the project but did not wish to leave any trace of his decision. The answer he gave to Quiroga was not registered in the chancery nor was the secretary, Antonio Pérez, aware of it. To the contrary, his answer was stamped in his own hand in Quiroga's very letter; the sovereign even wrote on the back: 'To the care of the Bishop', which was unusual for him. Indeed, the 'Prudent King' accepted the plan unconditionally, but he also wanted to know the opinion of his counsellors who were better informed about the events on the ground; this meant that the opinions and economic resources coming from Rome, Naples and Sicily needed to be set aside. Hence, Philip II was not acting on his own for 'with the wisdom and the caution of these three [Cardinal Quiroga, Cardinal Granvela and the marquis of Pescara] eventually some monies could be raised from there'. However, the plan was stopped precisely because the three of them did not consider it viable and Matías Bicudo was losing his reputation.<sup>27</sup>

### *The pontificate of Gregory XIII (1572-85)*

Thus far we have seen how don Sebastian of Portugal sent an embassy to Shah Tahmasp of Persia through Miguel de Abreu de Lima, who also represented Pope Pius V, King Philip II and the doge of Venice.<sup>28</sup> Little is known about Abreu's mission. Robert Gulbenkian doubted he ever reached the Safavid capital. However, Augustinian Melchor de los Angeles reports that the mission was accomplished, although with limited success.<sup>29</sup>

Several years after the initiatives of the Holy League of 1571, at the insistence of Matías Bicudo, don Juan de Austria, decided on his own to send an embassy to Persia making use of the Greek Marcos Trastopulo, Luis de Portillo and the bishop of Stonj, who resided in Ragusa with Matías Bicudo.<sup>30</sup> Diplomatic preparations began and the proposal was sent to the ambassadors in Rome and Lisbon. In July 1573 the ambassador in Rome awaited the early arrival of Matías Bicudo with the aim of proposing to the new pope, Gregory XIII, that Luis de Portillo and the bishop of Stonj travel to Persia and Moscow. After the arrangements were completed an important last minute change in plans occurred which was not communicated to

the Pope but only to the Greek, Marcos Trastopulo. The reason for this is still not clear, although it is thought that Juan de Austria did not consider the other two reliable enough. Bicudo arrived at Ragusa in the summer of 1575 and was able to establish an agent in Constantinople to inform him of the activities of the sultan and, as soon as he arrived, the agent started to prepare for his mission as secret agent in Persia.<sup>31</sup>

As for Abreu's mission in 1572, there are reliable sources that in November of 1576 the pontifical collector from Portugal communicated to the cardinal of Como that the preceding month a certain Horacio de Milan had returned from India. He had been imprisoned by the Turks during the siege at Famagusta in 1570 but had managed to escape to Persia where, in Casbin, he found a jeweller by the name of Mario Greco who accompanied the Portuguese ambassador sent to Persia by the Pope and King Philip II. Thereafter, Horacio de Milan returned to Europe by way of Hormuz and Goa. It appears that Mario Greco had an audience with the shah and then returned to Rome. Possibly, the ambassador referred to in this document was Abreu and Mario Greco was an envoy of Gregory XIII and Philip II charged with learning the results of the negotiations that started during the pontificate of Pius V.

We have a long passage dated December 1575 concerning what happened to a Hispanic-Portuguese-Pontifical embassy to Persia that confirms our suspicions. It is the mission of Francisco de Barros, sent in 1572; he was possibly a replacement for Abreu, but he had no success as the shah did not wish to establish an alliance. This prompted a report that a well-informed secretary in the Spanish chancery included in a marginal note on matters relating to the Orient, which we think is worthwhile transcribing for it provides specific details of Abreu's mission:

Este embajador [Abreu] fue enviado por parte de Su Santidad, el rey nuestro señor y el rey de Portugal, al cual el Sr. Don Juan envió un hombre y cédula de 12.000 ducados para si hubiera menester dineros, y se partió de Portugal y se detuvo como dos años en llegar, y llegó el 26 de febrero de 1575, y el embajador llegó cuando éste partió de Hormuz. Que le tenían al embajador del rey en Casbin muy apretado y maltratado en una casilla que no se puede habitar y que el sobrino del rey, que es el que gobierna por ser el rey viejo, que se maravillaba cómo un rey tan grande como el de Portugal no había enviado al rey Xatamas [Tahmasp] que es tan poderoso que llega a los cielos presente de dos cuentos de oro. Y parece ser que llegó presente hasta de 16.000 ducados en dinero y joyas y piezas de ellas, se las devolvieron con una cama que valdría 500 o 600 ducados, la cual tiene consigo el embajador ... le mataron un criado armenio que era su comprador ... y estaba para matar al embajador y todos sus hombres que serían 20, y de miedo uno de ellos se tornó moro ... y que la causa dicen porque querían al embajador era porque había entrado en la mezquita de Hormuz y quemado los libros que allí había, y que el embajador respondió que porque ellos habían quebrado la cruz de la iglesia que los portugueses querían hacer, y que ellos respondieron que por causa de aquel palo habían de hacer aquel daño en la mezquita, y que el

embajador había dicho que por aquel palo habían sido redimidos los cristianos y que le habían dejado y se había tratado otra cosa y le tenían detenido allí. Que este rey es el rey de Persia. Que el rey de Persia le recibió muy bien y que después que le vio y entendió su embajada, que era para que rompiese guerra, se agravió y comenzó a hacer maltratamiento sin responder ni decirle nada a su embajada, y no se vio más con el rey ni le habló, sino a un sobrino.<sup>32</sup>

In 1576 king Philip II also sent to Persia an Armenian emissary, a Juan Bautista, who would also meet the shah. Meanwhile, in Persia, Tahmasp died in 1576 and, after a succession dispute during which several claimants briefly occupied the throne, Mohammad Khodabande finally succeeded (1577–87). He was considered a weak man. The Turkish sultan Murad III decided to attack Persia directly in 1578, prompting a series of defeats for the Persians. An emissary of the shah went to Portugal in 1579 to seek help. But the reality was that until 1580 Philip II had enjoyed a certain degree of peace with the Turks, mainly due to truces.<sup>33</sup> These truces were, to a certain extent, forced since the Turks had to challenge the Persians and Philip II had to confront the different pressures from England and France. The Turkish military companies transferred to the land.<sup>34</sup> Overall, there were sufficient notices alerting the Catholic king that in the summer the Turks would attack Spain with 300 galleys, which would entail more expense. These were confusing notices for it was known that in reality the Ottomans did not want to start a direct attack but rather, at most, to pursue skirmishes and to get Philip II to continue spending his wealth in defending himself from possible attacks. In any case, a well-informed confidant said that it was essential to be careful for one could not trust the promises of such foolish people as the Ottomans, let alone their good faith.<sup>35</sup> There were attempts at Hispanic-Persian cooperation that we must mention, albeit briefly. In 1582 Frei Simao de Moiras, prior of the Augustinian convent of Hormuz, handed the shah letters from Philip II, again proposing an alliance with the Turks.<sup>36</sup> This time the shah was inclined towards the exchange of ambassadors. The French resident in Madrid, Monsieur de Longlée, informed Paris in 1583 of the announcement of the arrival of a Persian embassy to Lisbon. A new diplomatic way seemed to be opening which could be useful. A few years later, in 1586, news of battles between the Turks and the Persians reached Europe. The Spanish poet Andrés Flores wrote verses about the Spanish feelings favouring the Persians, friends of the Christians. It was fantastic propaganda propitiating the view of everyone and referring to Persia with renewed interest. The poem asserts that, once the Ottomans were defeated, the Persians would distribute the booty:

Tanta de la artillería  
tanto oro y plata labrada  
tanta joya y pedrería  
todo lo cual repartía  
con gente esforzada.



Especial a los cristianos  
 repartió gran cantidad  
 que los quieren los persianos  
 como si fueren hermanos  
 y los muestra su amistad.

So much artillery/ so much carved gold/ so many jewels and precious stones/  
 all of them distributed by bravehearts/ especially to the Christians/ to whom  
 he gave in such abundance/ that the Persians love them like brothers/ and so  
 prove their friendship.

These verses were printed in Valencia and Burgos in 1586 and contributed to increasing the myth of all that related to Persia. Not more than four years later historian Antonio Herrera from Tordesillas chose a current event to gain the confidence of the king. He translated the works of Juan Tomas Minadoi (1540–1615) with the title *History of the War between Turks and Persians*, from Italian. The work had appeared for the first time in Rome in 1587 and it described the battles that took place between 1576 and 1585 with maps, names, and so on and printed at the works of Francisco Sánchez in Madrid in 1588. It was exaggerated propaganda in favour of the Persians, which originated in the court itself, for it was dedicated to the royal secretary Juan de Idiáquez, one of Philip II's most reliable men. It led to new and particularly memorable Spanish missions to the far-off court of Abbas I, which were to take place in the following reign.<sup>37</sup>

As for Matías Bicudo there is confirmation that, as of 1584, he was in contact with the French ambassador in Venice. He had abandoned the Society of Jesus and joined the Franciscan order and furthermore he had become a great defender of Portuguese independence from the Hispanic monarchy.<sup>38</sup> During that year he served the prior of Crato, don Antonio of Portugal, claimant to the Portuguese crown and therefore enemy of Philip II. He was sent by don Antonio of Portugal to Constantinople and travelled through France where he contacted a Jewish spy in the service of France by the name of Saul Cohen.<sup>39</sup> He secretly stopped in Venice but as soon as he was discovered, Philip II, through his ambassador in Venice, immediately ordered that all necessary steps be taken to make him a prisoner.<sup>40</sup> There were then a series of unfruitful attempts to extract him from Venice and to imprison him.<sup>41</sup>

Despite all these disappointments, the Holy See sought to send an ambassador to Persia. In 1584 Gregory XIII, inspired by Cardinal Ferdinand of Medici, requested the Florentine knight Giovanni Battista Vecchietti to go on an important mission to Persia. He was to convince the shah to persevere in the war against the Turks, promising military help from the Pope and Philip II. The king of Spain had already entrusted a similar mission to the Augustinian Father Simón de Moiras. The Pope finally sent a short accreditation to the shah dated 28 February 1584. One of its main missions was to obtain manuscripts in Arabic, Persian and Turkish.<sup>42</sup> Vecchietti

arrived in Hormuz on 29 June 1587, fulfilled his mission carefully and returned to Italy passing through Madrid in 1589 to inform the king. It is known that the shah gave him a precious letter – written in golden letters, except for the shah's signature, as a gesture of humbleness – in which he wrote that he required two expert artillerymen, two architects to build fortresses and two sergeant majors who were expert cavalry tacticians. These demands were all-important since the shah was well aware of the military inferiority of his army. Shortly thereafter the Shirley brothers arrived, one of whom, Antonio, seems to have collaborated in the organization of the Persian army.<sup>43</sup>

Vecchietti carried with him a good number of Arabic books, amongst which was a Bible in Arabic that he left in Egypt the following year whilst on a pontifical mission. Gregory XIII took an interest in those books and instructed the Jesuit father of Jewish ancestry Giovanni Battista Eliano, an apostolic legate, to purchase them. The books cost 300 escudos.<sup>44</sup> Vecchietti returned to Persia in 1601; thereafter he stayed in Hormuz and became political counsel to the viceroy of Portugal Diego Núñez until 1603; subsequently he went to India. In Jaipur he became sick but was lodged and protected by the Jesuit Father Francesco, a Florentine like him, who had mastered the Persian language. This Jesuit was born in 1568, had joined the Order in 1587, was sent to Goa in 1599, and then was dispatched on a diplomatic mission to the Great Mogul of India.<sup>45</sup> He died in 1633 after 36 years of apostolic services in India. He was preceptor to the nephews of Emperor Jahangir in Uttar Pradesh and chaplain to the Armenian Prince Mirza Zu'lqarnayn, a soldier in the service of the Great Mogul. Having survived a number of risky adventures, Giovan Battista Vecchietti was able to return to Rome in October where he worked at the Oriental Library. He died on 8 December 1619.

It is worth pointing out that one of the instructions he had received from the Cardinal of Florence was to acquire in Persia books in Arabic, Arabic grammars in Persian and Turkish and vice-versa, and to obtain a book in Persian and Arabic with beautiful characters. He was passionate in his search for the Bible in Persian in 1606 he wrote to the Pope from Isfahan that he hoped to find all the books of the New Testament in some city of Persia where Christians had resided, although he had already gotten hold of the Gospels in Persian. The future Pope Paul V, Camillo Borghese, met Vecchietti in Madrid when he was extraordinary nuncio in that court in 1593 and for several months they discussed the importance of Persia in the international context. Vecchietti's dreams had come true; he had learnt correct Persian and was translating the book of Esther, a Persian queen.<sup>46</sup>

### *The pontificate of Sixtus V (1585-90)*

The Turks were at war against the Persians from 1578 to 1590, the Ottoman Empire gained dominion over Georgia, Yerevan and most of Armenia. The apogee of Murat III (1574-95) coincided with the decline of Muhammad Khodabande (1578-88).<sup>47</sup> This

crisis would also have consequences for the Hispanic monarchy. In 1582 Philip II had asked the viceroy of India to reiterate the previous offerings to Shah Tahmasp, but he died in 1576 and was succeeded by Haidar Mirza who was assassinated that same year. Thereafter Khudabanda reigned. This demonstrates the great ignorance there was in Spain about the events taking place in Persia; the only important matter for them was to prevent the Turks going to war against Spain. The viceroy in Naples accepted the proposal by Philip II and again sent Juan Bautista with a personal letter and an emissary of his own. They arrived in India where the new viceroy, don Francisco de Mascareñas had been instructed to initiate negotiations with the shah. For this reason the viceroy requested the Augustinian Fra Simón de la Concepción de Moraes, who spoke Persian, to go to the shah's court to finally agree on an alliance. Fra Simón asked Gregory XIII to unite the Christian princes in the fight against the Turks at the same time as he narrated his mission in Persia. Shah Tahmasp appointed him his son's preceptor since he was an expert mathematician. The shah decided to send him off to the court of Philip II together with a Persian ambassador but the vessel taking them to Europe sank in 1585, although it is also possible, according to another version, that Fra Simón was poisoned by the Armenian accompanying them.<sup>48</sup>

In the heart of the Turkish Empire there was great fear of the Persians. More precisely, they were worried about the heavy expenses incurred. It could well be said that Persia represented for the Ottoman Empire what Flanders represented for Philip II, or Candia for the doge of Venice, or Ireland for Elisabeth I, precisely because the expenses incurred in defending and occupying those territories were enormous and the revenue tiny. Furthermore, the Turks no longer wanted the help of the Tatars, who had lost all hope that the Turks were about to start a war against the Muscovites in exchange for their help in fighting the Persians, as narrated in a letter addressed to Pope Sixtus V from a pontifical spy who had infiltrated the Turkish army fighting in Persia. The Turks, left with no cavalry because of the 'lunga e faticosa guerra di Persia' (the long and exhausting war with Persia), feared the military strength of the Georgians and the Muscovites who, if they united, could take Syria and Egypt. Furthermore, they had lost the alliance with the Tatars, as they were unable to attack Moscow. For this reason they sought peace with the Persians. But Murat II mostly feared Philip II rather than the shah for his potential to bribe the Ottoman military commanders.<sup>49</sup> Shortly thereafter, in 1601, the Persian ambassador Antonio Sherley would propose to Clement VIII an attack on Syria or Palestine, on account of their supposed vulnerability and in order to open up a war front where the troops of the shah could also be deployed.<sup>50</sup>

The Persian-Hispanic climate of understanding favoured the settlement of Augustinians in Persia, particularly since the accession to the throne of Abbas I in 1587, who established the capital in Isfahan. The aim was to take advantage in Europe of the bitter rivalry between the Persians and Turks, as had already been tried in the past. The new Shah Abbas, soon after ascending the throne, had to

sign a peace treaty with the Ottomans in 1590, thereby losing a great portion of his north-western territories. Then the Armenians decided to ask the Holy See and the king of Spain for help. They wished to receive military reinforcements and in return were prepared to accept vassalage to the Pope and the king of Spain as well as receiving missionaries who would bring the Catholic faith. They promised to cooperate to regain the holy places in Palestine and Constantinople. This was not at all new; a similar situation can be found in Greece, Tunisia and even in Ireland. All were ready to become good Catholic vassals to the king of Spain. However, words were one thing and deeds another.

### *The pontificate of Clement VIII (1592-1605)*

Despite the failure of previous missions, Philip II persevered in his aim of achieving a Persian alliance. In 1594 he instructed Matías de Albuquerque, viceroy of India to send an embassy to Shah Abbas I, thus agreeing to his wish to maintain diplomatic correspondence. Two years later he did the same with the new viceroy, don Francisco de Gama, although this time insisting on the fact that the envoy should be a noble, someone with the same qualities as Abreu, who had been sent by don Sebastian in 1571. The new Pope was attentive to these moves and well aware of the importance of counting on the support of the religious who had gone to those places: Augustinians, Jesuits and Franciscans. Clement VIII wanted finally to establish the Catholic mission in Persia.

The establishment of the Catholic missions in Persia was determined by the arrival of two Portuguese clerics in Isfahan, the Franciscan Alonso Cordero and the Augustinian Nicolás de Melo, and the presence of the Jesuit Father Francisco de Acosta. In 1599 Nicolás de Melo sent the interpreter Angelo to Europe. He was an Armenian who had worked for the duke of Mantua. Angelo was sent to alert the Pope, Philip III and the viceroy of India that the shah would send an embassy to the Christian princes to sign a defensive alliance. In 1598 he had defeated the Uzbeks in the province of Khorasan, and Qazvin was no longer the capital, which had been moved to Isfahan.

The clerics met there with the Sherley brothers who were involved in the diplomatic and military affairs of the shah. In 1599, Abbas I decided to send to the Pope and the Catholic princes an embassy lead by Hosayn 'Ali Beg and Antonio Sherley with the aim of consummating the coalition. With them was the Augustinian Father Nicolás de Melo. The journey lasted more than two years; they crossed Russia to Europe and on their way they began to suspect the hidden motives of Antonio Sherley. The negotiations concerning the anti-Turk league took place in Prague, Rome and Valladolid. In Rome the Pope decided to separate the ambassadors: Sherley was to return to Persia – in fact, he ended up remaining in Venice – whilst Hosayn was to travel to Spain and return to Persia from Lisbon.<sup>51</sup> In Valladolid, Hosayn was treated very well; he attended the baptism of the Spanish infanta; received a gift of 2,000 escudos, a chain

worth 600 and four more worth 200 escudos to distribute to his favourite travelling companions, together with another 8,000 escudos for his return voyage. According to our witness, he left 'very pleased'.<sup>52</sup>

At almost the same time the shah sent his emissaries, Francisco de Acosta and captain don Diego de Miranda who had been in Persia, to Rome to inform the Pope of the shah's good intentions towards Christianity. The truth is that in 1600 the Pope elected Francisco de Acosta and captain Diego de Miranda to go to Persia as ambassadors, which prompted a disagreement with Vecchiotti, who accused Francisco de Acosta of having abandoned the Society of Jesus 'prete vagante' (priest without canonical permission) in Lisbon and Miranda of being an Indian, born in Hormuz, who had married a public prostitute in Rome. Despite the criticisms, the cardinal of Como decided to send three emissaries to Persia: the Spaniard Luis Félix, the Portuguese Francisco Acosta and Diego de Miranda.<sup>53</sup>

With respect to the Persian legation, and to make a point about the contribution of the Society of Jesus, we need to draw attention to the fact that upon his arrival in Prague, Antonio Sherley, an Anglican, asked the nuncio to provide him with a confessor for he wished to return to Catholicism. The nuncio put him in contact with a Spanish Jesuit, Pedro de Buiza, a man of 'molto valore' (a man of great courage) – in the nuncio's opinion – and 'well known in the court' – as the ambassador to Prague told the king. He was a theologian with great diplomatic virtues. Sherley did not want the confessor to be a French or English Jesuit, but a Spaniard. It appears the two understood each other well and became friends.<sup>54</sup> In Rome he also befriended some English Jesuits, counsellors to Philip III, Robert Persons (1546–1610) and Joseph Creswell (1556–1623). The ambassador to Rome – the duke of Sessa – informed the king by way of a coded letter that Sherley and Persons were good friends. Sherley would not stop mentioning everywhere that the shah was prepared to cooperate with 60,000 infantrymen and as many cavalrymen in the fight against the Turks. In exchange, he requested specific cooperation, exchange of ambassadors, freedom of trade, military support and in particular that the bars of iron arriving at Hormuz be longer to allow the manufacture of swords according to the measures customary to the Persians.

According to what Francisco de Acosta told the Pope, Abbas I, who was the son and husband of Christians, seemed inclined to Christianity. His wife was the daughter of Simon Causeno – whose lineage could be traced back to the Kings of Georgia – and Allahverdi Khan was a friend to the Christians. The Jesuit wrote a long report about Persia that he handed to the ambassador in Rome, the duke of Sessa, who in turn sent it to Philip III.<sup>55</sup> On the other hand, Acosta held lengthy conversations with some Spanish Jesuits in Rome, with Bartolomé Pérez and Juan Álvarez, Spanish and Portuguese assistants to Father Acquaviva, and with Father Sebastian Rodríguez. The decision-making authorities of the Society of Jesus had doubts about Acosta's true intentions for he seemed too inclined towards the shah's military plan. Francisco de Acosta left the Society in 1598, although he was readmitted when he was sent as ambassador to Persia,

for he had a duty to send to Persia, via Hormuz, a good number of Jesuits coming from India.<sup>56</sup>

In 1601 Pope Clement VIII was enthusiastic about the embassy and sent a diplomatic mission to Acosta in his capacity as legate *a latere* before Abbas. Acquaviva, on his side, was to obtain support from Philip III to facilitate Jesuit access to Persia. It must be taken into account that in 1600 Phillip III had already sent three Augustinians to Persia to ask the shah to pursue the war against the Turks, which is why royal favour to Jesuits caused some distrust amongst the Augustinians. The antipathy of the Augustinians towards the Jesuit mission was such that the archbishop of Braga, the Augustinian Agustín de Castro, threatened the king to stop favouring the Jesuit mission in Persia. The Augustinians thought they had exclusive rights because they had started their mission in Hormuz in 1571 when the Jesuits had abandoned the place because of its unsanitary conditions. In 1572 there were no fewer than 12 Augustinians in Hormuz and Goa, as a matter of fact they had established houses in Bandar Abbas, in Muscat and other places. The ambassadors sent by Philip II had been Augustinians, like Father Simón de Moraes. The progress of the order had been enormous, such that in 1600 they had more than 200 members. Sending Jesuits rather than Augustinians could be taken as an insult.<sup>57</sup> In short, due to the pressure he was under the king did not authorize the sending of Jesuits. Nevertheless, Acosta went to Persia accompanied by the soldier Diego de Miranda, although they parted in disagreement. Only Acosta reached Isfahan. He was presented by the Augustinians residing there as the apostolic legate. He became military counsellor to the shah and participated in the military campaigns against the Turks. This fact, which the shah himself disclosed in a letter to the Pope, reveals the military merits of Acosta. He was probably related to the Persian general Allahverdi Khan, who was considered a friend of the Christians.<sup>58</sup>

The preliminary arrangements for Acosta's legation were swiftly made but they did not, however, forget to point out that it was of the utmost importance to establish a permanent Jesuit mission in Hormuz, despite Philip III's opposition. Yet the Jesuits and Augustinians were not the only ones to report on the situation in Persia to the Pope, other reports came from different quarters. Since 1582 an Armenian by the name of Thomas, who mastered the Persian language, was working at the Vatican Library. When the embassy of Hosayn 'Ali Beg arrived he was appointed their interpreter. Besides, the Pope wanted Thomas to accompany the ambassador on his mission to Spain and Portugal as interpreter despite the fact that the ambassador himself spoke Turkish and that there was an official Turkish interpreter in Spain. It is known that during his stay in Spain the Persian's translator was not Thomas but Diego de Urrea. One of Hosayn's objectives in Lisbon was to ship back to Persia a significant amount of arms, which was permitted by the king. Four members of the ambassadorial party converted to Catholicism and subsequently remained in Spain and their Muslim 'chaplain' was killed in Merida.

Philip III's counsel of state determined in March of 1602 that, in response to Hosayn 'Ali Beg's embassy, once he had spoken to the provincial of the order of Castille, a Jesuit chosen by the cardinal of Seville was to be sent, together with a Portuguese noble, don Luis Pereyra de la Cerda. Nothing is known about the Jesuit, most likely he was not able to depart due to Augustinian opposition. However, we do know that in 1603 Luis Pereyra departed for Persia where he arrived the following year.<sup>59</sup> Given the great tensions between Augustinians and Jesuits the Pope was inclined to send some Capuchins to Persia as well to allow the Catholic mission a greater chance of success.<sup>60</sup> It was all getting complicated with the many different, individual interests of Jesuits, Augustinians, Capuchins and Carmelites; together with the tensions between the ambassadors and the Spaniards and the Portuguese. They did not realize that they were placing the prospective Persian alliance at risk.

On the other hand, it must also be taken into account that in 1600 Philip III had already sent three Augustinians to Persia to request the shah to pursue the war against the Turks. But the political and religious situation in Persia changed when a Carmelite mission, sent by Clement VIII, arrived in 1601. The Pope cancelled Acosta's mission when he learnt that he had acted with little fidelity to his instructions. The confusion was such that it could be said that no mission was safe. But on the Persian side something similar was happening. Their different embassies ended in failure due to the division of their members, such as the separation between Hosayn 'Ali Beg and Antonio Sherley who were growing further apart.<sup>61</sup>

Nevertheless, the shah, who gradually began to notice the religious divisions between the Spanish and Portuguese, decided to send Acosta as ambassador to Rome in 1605, where he arrived in 1607 via Moscow.<sup>62</sup> But it was all too late. In 1606 the emperor had signed a truce with the Turks and Philip III would not support the Persians in open warfare, either in the Mediterranean or in the Persian Gulf. The following year relations further deteriorated to the extent that the shah announced that he was prepared to expel the religious, persecute his Christian vassals and take Hormuz.

In 1614 the news arriving in Spain confirmed that Christians, Armenians and Syrians were being persecuted and that the Carmelites and Augustinians had left Persia. When the religious orders returned to Isfahan the tensions between Carmelites and Augustinians continued. There were several prominent incidents that reverberated in Spain through publications in 1611 and in 1624.<sup>63</sup> The main event was when the shah fulfilled his threat and, with English help, took Hormuz in 1622. In August of that same year a public auction took place in London to sell the goods seized during the conquest of Hormuz, which contributed to the increasing distrust that was building up in Madrid in relation to the possible wedding of the Prince of Wales to a Spanish infanta (princess).<sup>64</sup>

The clues to a political interpretation of these changes stem from two aspects. On one side the tensions between Augustinians and Carmelites and the distorting element of Francisco de Acosta; on the other, the constant disputes between

the Spaniards and the Portuguese. In sum, the Augustinians confronted the Jesuits and the Spanish Carmelites confronted the Portuguese Augustinians. It should be noted that it was the shah who, in 1608, requested the help of the Christian powers, an appeal which once again led to the exchange of a number of embassies. The Carmelites arrived in 1607 and their apostolate with the Armenian Christians, Antonio de Gouvea, was the one who did the most to achieve the union of the Armenians.<sup>65</sup>

### *Conclusion*

From the early-1570s Safavid sovereigns, the Habsburgs and successive popes explored the possibility of a common policy with regard to a common enemy. Contact between Persians and Spaniards was advanced by a number of Catholics such as Gaspar de Berze, Francisco de Acosta, Alonso Cordero, Nicolás de Melo and others. The dialogue that they began embraced a number of themes of great importance: Persian policies towards the Christian minorities within their domains and their common fight against the Ottoman Turks were addressed, as were the limits of the territorial and commercial expansion of the European powers in Asia. True, there are elements of this history which remain difficult to measure and others where the personal interests or prejudices of the diplomats predominated, such as in the tendency of some religious to advance (improbable) military schemes.

It has been the objective of this chapter to underline the importance of the role of a number of Jesuits in the approach to the Safavid shahs. Taking his lead from Pius V, Francisco de Borgia was in favour of the military alliance with 'the Persian'; however, he was sceptical about the more ambitious proposals advanced by some of his colleagues. Matías Bicudo and Francisco de Acosta, in contrast, were drawn to more extreme measures. These men were true crusaders. They did not limit themselves to mere apostolic activities or initiatives and readily involved themselves in military matters, espionage and plans for the conquest and division of Ottoman domains. The same outlook could be found in Persons and Creswell, the two Jesuits who contacted Antonio Sherley.

These Jesuits were, of course, exceptional figures, but the very fact that their letters, proposals, reports and pleas are to be found in the General Archive of Simancas gives an indication that their initiatives commanded attention in the highest echelons of political and military government in Spain. Their legacy was far from negligible, although it took a form that would have surprised and, perhaps, disappointed them. In the following century the Society of Jesus would take a different path, for the missionaries who succeeded in establishing themselves in Iran in 1648 were neither Portuguese nor Spanish. Instead, it was Frenchmen such as François Rigordi, Aimé Chezard and Alexandre de Rhodes who marched forward as Christian soldiers into the heart of the Persian world.



## Notes

1. Since the original preparation of this chapter, a number of important works have been published which cast further light on the area. Enrique García Hernán, 'The Persian Gentlemen at the Spanish Court in the Early Seventeenth Century', Jorge Flores – Ruddy Matthee (eds), *Portugal, the Persian Gulf and Safavid Persia* (Leuven, Peeters, 2011), pp. 283–300; Rafael Valladares, *Castilla y Portugal en Asia (1580–1680). Declive imperial y adaptación* (Leuven University Press, 2001); Luis Gil Fernández, *El Imperio Luso-Español y la Persia Safávida, Tomo I (1582–1605), Tomo II (1606–1622)*, (Madrid, FUE, 2006–2009). I have also published a shortened Castilian version of it, 'Persia en la acción conjunta del papado y la Monarquía Hispánica. Aproximación a la actuación de la Compañía de Jesús (1549–1649)', *Hispania Sacra* 73 (2010), pp. 213–241. On the Ottoman–Safavid conflict see A. Allouche, *The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict (906–962/1500–1555)* (Berlín, 1983); J. L. Bacqué-Grammont, *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leur voisins*, (Estambul, 1987), y *The Persian Presence in the Islamic World*, edited by Richard G. Hovannisian and Georges Sabagh (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998). On the Catholic Church in Iran and its missionary activities, see Carlos Alonso, 'Clemente VIII y la fundación de las misiones católicas en Persia. Un capítulo previo a la penetración de los misioneros agustinos', *La Ciudad de Dios* 171 (1958) 196–239; Angelo Bugnini, *La Chiesa in Iran* (Roma, 1981); V. Preiss, *De restauratione missionum in Persia saec. XVII Poloniaeque partibus* (Diss. PUUrbanian, Roma, 1936). J. Escalera, 'Irán', in Ch. E. O'Neill – J. M. Domínguez, *Diccionario Histórico de la Compañía de Jesús* (Roma-Madrid, IHSI, 2001, 4 vols), IV, pp. 2066–2067. Concerning the following century, I am researching on other religious orders, such as Augustinians and Carmelites.
2. Georg Schurhammer, *Francisco Javier, su vida y su tiempo*, IV vol. IV, (Pamplona, 1992), pp. 484–519.
3. J. Aubin, 'Le royaume d'Hormuz au début du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle', *Mare Luso-Indicum* 2 (Ginebra, 1973), pp. 77–179. Niels Steensgaard, *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century* (Chicago, 1974); *Diccionario Histórico de la Compañía de Jesús* (Madrid-Roma, 2002), I, p. 427. See also N. Trigault, *Vita Gasparis Barzaei Belgae* (Antuerpiae, 1610 y Douai 1615).
4. AGS. E. 385, 54, 58, 59. Maximilian II to shah; instruction to Jacobo Draperis, 'lo que el emperador escribe sobre la embajada de Persia' y 'Apuntamientos del emperador sobre la embajada del persiano'. The ambassador in Lisbon was don Alonso de Tovar, see his 'Relación del viaje de Portugal a Persia, 7 enero 1567', en AGS. E. 385, 55. The king of Portugal was in contact with the shah through the viceroy of India and the captain of Hormuz. The fleet sailed from Lisbon to Goa once each year in March or April, and the convoy went from Goa to Hormuz in November–December and again towards the end of March. The journey in winter passed through India to Hormuz, and in spring through Rosalgate. Both involved a month of travel.
5. Carlos Alonso, 'Embajadores de Persia en las cortes de Praga, Roma y Valladolid (1600–1601)', *Anthologica Annua* 36 (1989), pp. 11–271; Carlos Alonso, *La embajada a Persia de D. García de Silva y Figueroa (1612–1624)* (Badajoz, 1993). On Spain and Persia see B. Alonso Acero, *Sultanes de Berbería en tierras de la cristiandad. Exilio musulmán, conversión y asimilación en la Monarquía hispánica (siglos XVI–XVII)* (Barcelona, Bellaterra, 2006); Mas, A., *Les Turcs dans la littérature espagnole du Siècle d'Or* (Paris, 1967), y Bunes Ibarra, Miguel Ángel de, *La imagen de los musulmanes en la España de los siglos XVI–XVII. Los caracteres de una hostilidad* (Madrid, 1989).
6. José María Floristán Imízcoz, *Fuentes para la política oriental de los Austrias: la documentación griega del Archivo de Simancas, 1571–1621* (León, 1986); A. G. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier* (Chicago, 1978); C. Rodríguez Joulian de Saint-Cyr, *Felipe III y el rey del Cuco* (Madrid, 1954).
7. AGS. E. 493. Cristóbal de Moura to Philip III, Lisbon, 27-X-1601. 'Y así las veces que el rey, que haya gloria, le escribió, nunca trató de otra cosa que de animarle contra el turco y ofrecerle que por acá sería gallardamente ayudado, para que todos en un mismo tiempo hiciesen daño al enemigo común'. Vid. Alonso, 'Embajadores de Persia'.
8. Carlos Alonso, 'Nueva documentación inédita sobre las misiones agustinianas en la India y en Persia (1571–1609)', *Archivo Agustiniiano* 33 (1970), pp. 253–7; P. Z. Novoa, 'El M.R.P. Fr. Melchor de los Ángeles,

- agustino, primer misionero en Persia', en *Archivo Agustiniiano* 45 (1951), pp. 263–75; Enrique García Hernán, 'Pío V y el mesianismo profético', *Hispania Sacra* 45 (1993), pp. 83–102.
9. ASV. Miscell. Arm. II, 82, 392. 'Conferirete il tutto co' il sudetto P. Generale, governandovi secondo il suo consiglio, parlando con chi a sua paternità reverenda parerà a proposito et expediente'. See Enrique García Hernán, *La acción diplomática de Francisco de Borgia al servicio del Pontificado* (Valencia, 2000).
  10. ASV. Senado, dispaci, Roma, 7, 113, Soriano-Soranzo to Dux, Roma, 3 junio 1571. Sobre la elección de Alejandrino, véase ASV. Act. Miscell. 36. During the consistorial meeting of 23 May the Pope decided to send legates to the Christian princes, and on 18 June Alexandrine was elected officially. For some documents detailing his legacy see ASV. Reg. Vat. 2014, 9 (to Philip II) and 15 (to Sebastian), dated 18 June; another copy in BAV. Barb. Lat. 2412. AGS. E. 390, 83. Pius V to the Shah, 12-XII-1571.
  11. About Bicudo, see Marqués de Azebedo, *Apontamientos históricos... de la provincia de San Paulo*, 2 vols (Rio de Janeiro, 1879). A very famous member of this family was Hidalgo, who died in 1650. See G. Pereira Esteves e Rodrigues, *Portugal. Dicionario histórico*, 7 vols (Lisbon, 1904–15).
  12. AGS. E. 918, 150, Juan de Zúñiga to Philip II, Roma, 14-III-1572.
  13. On Lepanto, see David y Enrique García Hernán, *On Lepanto, On día después* (Madrid, Actas, 1999).
  14. *Monumenta Borgia* (Madrid, 1911), V, p. 647, Francis Borgia to Marco Antonio Colonna, Lisbon, 10-XII-1571. 'Quanto a la liga, che questo principe ci entra molto volontieri, et non solamente per il Mar Rosso et Persico, et per la Ethiopia, vole far guerra al turco, ma anche per questa parte vol dar aiuto alla armata christiana'.
  15. AGS. E. 918, 271. Marco Antonio Colonna to Philip II, Rome, 20-I-1572.
  16. AGS. E. 917, 121. Philip II to Zúñiga, 22-XII-1571. 'en lo que toca al Sofi, no hay duda sino que importaría mucho que por todas estas partes se apretase al turco para mayor daño y destrucción suya, y para procurar persona a propósito para esto se hará diligencia por vía de Portugal; y para ello he mandado que se escriba a mi embajador y también para que por parte del rey de Portugal se haga esta diligencia y se advierta al legado para que él ayude por su parte, si ya no fuere partido'.
  17. ASV. SS. Spagna 5, 50. Castagna to Flaminio Donato d'Aspra, Madrid, 12-I-1572. Another copy of this documents in AGS. E. 390, 82–83–83; 157–158–159, y en ASV. Arm. XLIV, 19, 441. Letter of Philip II to kings of Persia, Ethiopia an Arabia en AGS. E. 390, 148–150, (15 March 1572). *Rudimenta linguae Persicae auctore Ludovico de Dieu; accedunt duo priora capita Geneseos ex persica translatione Iac. Tawusi* (Lugduni Batavorum, ex Officina Elseviriana, 1639), [8], 95 p. 4, Madrid, Palacio Real, Pas. Arm. 1/99 (1).
  18. AGS. E. 390, 80. Sebastian to the shah, Lisbon, 26-II-1572. Archivo General de Simancas. E. 390, 81. Copy of the instruction to Miguel de Breu. AGS. E. 3990, 161. Philip II to Juan Borgia, 28-II-1572. See Carlos Alonso, *A los orígenes de las relaciones entre la Santa Sede y Persia (1571–72)*, en *Dalla Chiesa antica alla Chiesa moderna. Miscellanea per il Cinquentesimo della Facoltà di Storia Ecclesiastica della Pontificia Università Gregoriana*; M. S. I. Fois, Monachino, V. S. I. and Litva, F. S. I. (eds), (Roma, 1983), pp. 215–29. See also, Luis Gil, 'Embajadas de Felipe II a Persia: inútil búsqueda de un aliado contra los turcos', *Historia* 16 178 (1991), pp. 39–46.
  19. Fr Juan Tadeo de San Eliseo O.C.D. knew Persian language. Lodewijk de Dieu (1590–1642) published in Leyden in 1639 the *Rudimenta Linguae Persicae*. In 1649 the *Elementa Linguae Persicae* edited in London by John Greaves (1602–52). See also the *Alphabetum persium, cum oratione dominicali et salutatione angelica* (Romae, typis Sac. Congreg. de Propag. Fide, 1784). In Spain one of the few people who knew the Persian language was the Basque Francisco de Gurmendi, who in 1612 was the translator at the royal court for Arabic, Turkish and Persian.
  20. AGS. E. 390, 80. Sebastian to the shah, Lisbon 27-II-1572. AGS. E. 390, 81. Instructions to Miguel de Abreu.
  21. ASVen. Archivio Proprio Spagna 6, 152, Copia tradotta dalla risposta all'Ambasciatore.
  22. ASVen. Archivio Proprio Spagna 6, 147, Tiepolo to Mocenigo, Almeirin, 19-I-1572.
  23. ASVen. Annali, 1571, (old signature Cod. di Brera, 339) 302, 303. Sebastian to the dux. 24-I-1572 (collaborating with the holy league). Another in 31-I-1572 (sent one ambassador to the king of Persia). ASVen. Archivio Proprio Spagna, 6, 153, Tiepolo to Mocenigo, 13-I-1572.

24. AGS. E. 1135, 66 y 67.
25. AGS. E. 1138. Juan de Austria to Philip II, Mesina, 2-II-1572. 'A Alexandría de Egipto he enviado yo dos hombres que Mathías Bicudo, aquel portugués que el año pasado andaba en esa corte me ha dado a entender lo que por allí se podría hacer, daré aviso a V. M. de la relación que de ellos tuviere. A Rodas, a Corón y a África y a Trípoli y a Constantinopla he enviado estos días hombres a entender el estado en que se hallan allí las cosas, y con algunas pláticas, y tratado. Hasta ver si tienen fundamento de sustancia no quiero cansar a V. M. con escribir las particularidades de ellas'.
26. *Colección de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España*, (Madrid), III, 351. Don Juan de Austria a los cristianos de la isla de Rodas, Mesina 15 de enero 1572.
27. AGS. E. 153, 155. Bishop of Cuenca to Philip II with the answer inside: 'entendido lo de la liga y lo que hace el Turco, que no podrá dejar de saberse pronto, podremos ir con quienes será bien tratar de esto, y creo que entonces lo será escribir al cardenal Granvela, que tiene mucha noticia de estas cosas, que las tratase con el cardenal Amulio, y que entre ambos desde allí [Roma] se comunicasen con el marqués de Pescara [virrey de Sicilia] a quien también se podrá escribirle sobre ello'. AGS. E. 1134, 164. Juan de Austria to Philip II, Mesina, 25-XI-1571. 'V. M. se debe acordar de un portugués que andaba en esa corte cuando yo partí de ella que se llama Matías Bicudo, el cual fue encaminado por el cardenal Amulio al obispo de Cuenca y trataba de ser parte para rendir en los confines del Cayro y Alexandria un gran señor vasallo del Turco. Este se halla al presente en Roma y escrito a don Juan de Zúñiga que me lo envíe con intención de que haga el viaje que ha ofrecido, particularmente así que el negocio tiene algún fundamento de agora tiempo de intentarlo. Llegado aquí pienso despacharle y avisar a V. M. de lo que con él se tratare...' See Enrique García Hernán, *La armada española en la Monarquía de Felipe II y la defensa de Mediterráneo* (Madrid, Tempo, 1995).
28. AGS. E. 390, 80. 'Copia de la carta que el serenísimo rey de Portugal escribió a Xathamas, rey de Persia', 26-II-1572. AGS. E. 390, 81. 'Copia de la instrucción que el serenísimo rey de Portugal dio al embajador que envió al rey de Persia, Miguel Dabreu'.
29. *L'Ambassade en Perse de Luis Pereira de Lacerda et des Pères Portugais de l'Orde de Saint Agustin Melchor dos Anjos et Guilherme de Santo Agostinho, 1604-1605* (Lisbon, 1972), p. 28. Véase AGS. E. 495. 'Lo que dicen los dos padres agustinos que han venido de Persia acerca del estado en que está aquella, Melchor de los Ángeles y Juan de San José, 6 enero 1614'.
30. Is Bonifacio de Esteba O. Min. Obs., born in Ragusa, bishop of Stonj, (17-XI-1561 till 1582, year of his death). Conradus Eubel, *Hierarchia Catholica* (Monasterii, 1923), III, 304.
31. There are six letters of Bicudo (Ragusa, 29-VIII; 13-IX; 1-X; 26-X; 9-XI; y 1-XII.). AGS. E. 1517., 1, 9, 23, 24, 27 y 30.
32. AGS. E. 1517. 12-XII-1575. This ambassador [Abreu] was sent by His Holiness, the king our lord and the king of Portugal, to whom Don Juan sent a man and a bill of exchange for 12,000 ducats should he need the money. They departed from Portugal and travelled for two years, arriving on 26 February 1575, the ambassador arriving when he left Hormuz. The king's ambassador in Casbin was rather ill-treated, (lodged) in a hut which could not be inhabited, and it was the king [of Persia's] nephew who was governing, for the king/[shah?] was old; he wondered how a king such as that of Portugal had not sent king Xatamas [Tahmasp] who is so powerful he could reach the skies, presents of two million ducats in gold. And it seems he arrived with presents worth up to 16,000 ducats in monies, jewels and other pieces; and in return he received a bed that could be worth 500 or 600 ducats which the ambassador has in his possession... they killed an Armenian servant of his who was his shopper... and decided to kill the ambassador and all his men who were about 20 and, out of fear, one of them turned Muslim... and they say the reason they wanted (to kill) the ambassador was because he had entered the mosque in Hormuz and burned the books that were there, and the ambassador replied it was because they had broken the Cross of the church that the Portuguese wanted to build there. And they responded that on account of that pole were they to inflict such damage in the mosque, and the [Portuguese] ambassador said that by 'that pole' the Christians had been redeemed, and [at this] they moved onto another matter but

kept him detained there. And this king to whom I refer is the king of Persia, who had received him excellently although having welcomed him and understood that his embassy was for a war, [the king] was offended and started the maltreatment without responding or saying anything to this ambassador, and he never again saw or spoke to the king, but only to his nephew.

33. The first truce started in 1577 and was subsequently renewed until 1593. Juan de Marigliano (born in Milan) was the representative of the Spanish monarchy in Constantinople. Henry II of France did everything in order to destroy these negotiations, with the collaboration of the Holy See. The Turks sought to mislead the French, denying the existence of this truce, Henry III to Abbé de Lile. Poitiers 7-IX-1577. García Hernán, *La armada española*, pp. 55–60.
34. BAV. Urb. Lat. 831, 487. 'Le provincie presse dal gran Turco, cominciando dall'anno 1577'.
35. 'Cartas y avisos diferentes a don Juan de Zúñiga en 1581'. *Colección de libros españoles raros o curiosos* (Madrid, 1887), p. 18.
36. See, Carlos Alonso, El P. Simón de Moraes, 'pionero de las misiones agustinianas en Persia', en *Analecta Agustiniana* 24 (1979) 343–72
37. Andrés de Flores, *Relación muy verdadera: que trata de las brauas y cruelisimas batallas, y balerosos rencuentros, y las crueles muertes de tantos y tan soberuios Turcos tan balerosos y Capitanes y famosos Basanes que en las batallas a dado el baleroso Rey de Persia al soberuio y poderoso campo nunca visto, que el gran turco embia a la Persia ...*, (Burgos, por Santillana, 1586), 4 hoj., 4º, en la BNM, VE/193–8. Minadoi, Giovaani Tommaso, trad. Herrera y Tordesillas, Antonio, *Historia de la guerra entre turcos y persianos ... , comenzando del año de 1576 que fueron los primeros motivos della, hasta el año de 1585* (Madrid, Francisco Sánchez, 1588) 1932 h, 4º. BNM, R/23810.
38. AGS. E. 1517, 1, 9, 23, 24, 30.
39. AGS. E. 1260, 94. Mathias Bicudo to the French ambassador in Venice, Ferrara, 4-V-1585. AGS. E. 1260, 98 y 100 two letter of Bicudo to Saúl Cohen.
40. AGS. E. 1340, 26, 33, 37, 73. 1583–4.
41. AGS. E. 1341, 83. 'Juan Bautista de Tassis me escribió a los 20 y 21 de febrero como don Antonio enviaba a Constantinopla a un fraile que se llama Matías Bicudo, que antes que tomase el hábito de San Francisco sirvió a V. M. por orden de don Juan de Austria, que está en el cielo, en Ragusa, y otras partes el año 73 y 74 ... y le detuviere como fraile apóstata'. Cristóbal de Salazar a Felipe II, Venecia, 2 mayo 1583. AGS. E. 1341, 4. En lo de tomar a Matías Bicudo no se pudo efectuar por haber mudado de parecer el embajador de Francia y también porque le socorrieron agora para pasar en Constantinopla con 700 ducados, como Saúl Cohen me ha dicho, dejándose ir a Ferrara por esto, y aunque con el nuncio he hecho toda diligencia posible para que se prendiera, por ser nuevo y haber sido dos fiestas juntas ayer y anteier no se ha podido hacer diligencia en el oficio de la inquisición para prenderle, y ha sido necesario a los 24 de éste dar información de cómo andó sin hábito y que está fuera de la religión, porque a otra manera no se diera licencia para prenderle, porque es menester el brazo seglar y siempre se hace así, y ha sido gran impedimento, porque la inquisición no tiene ministros para prender, no obstante que se ha visto por una carta que el papa ha mandado se prenda. Y hanme avisado que partió anteier el Matías sin saberse por qué parte salió de aquí, ni aun de los mismo de la casa del embajador, porque salió sin ser visto, sino de uno que le abrió la puerta antes del amanecer, Cristóbal de Salazar to Philip II, Venice, 27-VII-1585.
42. The details of the journey were published by Ugo Tucci, 'Una relazione di G. B. Vecchietti sulla Persia e sul regno di Hormuz 1587', *Oriente Moderno* (1955), pp. 149–60.
43. For more details on the letter to the shah, see E. Rossi, 'Elenco dei manoscritti persiani della Biblioteca Vaticana', *Studi e Testi* 136, (Città del Vaticano, 1948). Two letters of Abbas to Clement VIII (ASV. Vat. Pers. 164 y 165).
44. Roberto Amalgia, 'Giovann Battista e Gerolamo Vecchietti, viaggiatori in Oriente', *Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei* 9 (1956), pp. 313–50, 319; A. Vaccari, 'Una bibbia araba per il primo Gesuita venuto al Libano', *Mélanges Université Saint Joseph* 10 (1925), pp. 79–104.

45. E. Hambye, 'Francesco Corsi', *Diccionario Histórico de la Compañía de Jesús* (Madrid-Roma, 2002), I, p. 969.
46. BAV, Cod. Barb. Lat. 4602, 190. G. B. Vecchiotti a Paulo V, Ispahán, 15 julio 1606, en Roberto Amalgia, 'Giovann Battista e Gerolamo Vecchiotti', pp. 313–50, 348–50.
47. Rhoads Murphy, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700* (London, 1999), p. 4. Abbas I recuperará Tabriz en 1603 y Erivan en 1604.
48. Carlos Alonso, 'Nueva documentación', pp. 309–93. Arnulf Hartmann, OSA, 'The Agustians in golden Goa. A manuscript by Felix of Jesus OSA', *Analecta Agustiniana* 30 (1967), p. 13.
49. ASV. Varia Politicorum, 159, 61–82. Relazione di personaggio qualificato sopra lo stato del turco. 'Havendo S. M. tanto oro dall'Indie non gli corrompa i ministri per intendere i suoi secreti et anco per divertire le guerre da suoi paesi caricandoli altri, et di più per causargli alcuna sollevatione ne suoi stati et fino nei propri figlioli ...', 68v.
50. ASV. Borghese IV, Vol, 52, 334–7, in Carlos Alonso, 'Embajadores de Persia en las Cortes de Praga, Roma y Valladolid (1600–1601)', *Anthologica Annu* 36 (1989), p. 212.
51. On Nicolás de Melo (1578–1615), see Gregorio de Santiago Vela, *Ensayo de una biblioteca ibero-americana de la Orden de San Agustín*, (Madrid, 1920), V, pp. 373–7; and Carlos Alonso, 'El P. Nicolás de Melo, OSA. Embajador y Mártir', *Misionalia Hispanica* 15 (1958), pp. 219–44. On Antonio de Gouvea (1575–), see Joseph Metzler, 'Nicht erfüllen Hoffnungen in Persien', in *Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide Memoria Rerum* (Freiburg 1971), I/1, pp. 680–705, Gregorio de Santiago Vela, *Ensayo de una biblioteca ibero-americana*, pp. 253–79; Gil, Luis and Floristán, J. M., 'Las misiones luso-españolas en Persia y la Cristiandad armenia (1600–1614)', *Sefarad* 46 (1986), pp. 207–19; J. M. Floristán, 'Carta del Patriarca armenio David IV a Felipe III', *Safarad* 46 (1986), pp. 197–205.
52. Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas en la corte de España desde 1599 hasta 1614* (Junta de Castilla y León, 1997), p. 122.
53. Roberto Amalgia, 'Giovann Battista e Gerolamo Vecchiotti', pp. 313–50, 324.
54. ASV. Borghese III, 87, 133. Nuncio de Praga, Spinelli, al cardenal de San Jorge, Praga, 13 noviembre 1600. AGS. E. 707, 23–4. Guillén de San Clemente a Felipe III, Praga, 10 marzo 1601. Vid. Carlos Alonso, 'Embajadores de Persia'. Pedro de Buiza (Medina de Rioseco 1561–Toledo 1626), theologian, practised his profession in Rome in 1600 and was later confessor of the count of Fuentes, governor of Milan. He died as superior of the religious house in Toledo.
55. We have not found in AGS the report sent by Acosta to Philip III. There is a detailed report to the Pope. ASV. Borghese, II, 20, 158–9, 'Informazione di Francesco da Costa, sacerdote portuguese, venuto dall'India, alla Santità di Nostro Signore intorno all'ambasciata del Persiano', publicado por Carlos Alonso, 'Una embajada de Clemente VIII a Persia (1600–1609)', *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae* 34 (1996), pp. 7–125, 77–9.
56. AGS. K. 1630. Relación de la embajada que el rey de Persia envió con don Antonio Sherley y Cusán Alibey, persiano. Roma, 8 junio 1601, publicada por Alonso, 'Embajadores de Persia', pp. 223–6.
57. Carlos Alonso, 'El P. Simón de Moraes', pp. 343–72.
58. See *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. The Jesuits were well acquainted with the arts of war. See also *Diccionario Histórico de la Compañía de Jesús* (Madrid-Roma, 2002).
59. AGS. E. 191. Philip III to Cristóbal de Moura, viceroy of Portugal, Valladolid, 6-III-1602.
60. AGS. K. 1631, 217. Duke of Sessa to Philip III, Rome, 25-XI-1602.
61. See *A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia and the Papal Missions of the XVIIth and XVIIIth Centuries* (Londres, 1939); Carlos Alonso, *Ángel María Cittadino, OP, arzobispo de Naxiwan (+1629). Una iniciativa de Propaganda Fide a favor de armenia* (Roma, 1970); Pietro Della Valle, *I viaggi di ...*, (Roma, 1668); A. de Gouvea, *Relaçam em que se tratam as guerras e grandes victorias que alcançou o grande rey de Persia Xa Abbas do grao turco Mahometto & seu filho Amethe ...*, (Lisbon, 1611); R. Gulbenkian, *L'ambassade en Perse de Luis Pereira de Lacerda et des Perès Portugais de l'Ordre de Saint-Augustin, Melchior dos Anjos et Guilherme de Santo Agostinho, 1604–1605* (Lisbon, 1972); San J. de Miguel, *Crónica de la provincia franciscana de San*

- Miguel (Madrid, 1989); A. Da Silva Rego, *Documentação para a história das missoes da padroado português do Oriente* (Lisbon, 1955-8).
62. Carlos Alonso, 'Una embajada de Clemente VIII', pp. 7-125.
63. Obispo de Cirene Antonio de Gouveia (O.S.A.), *Relaçam em que se tratam as guerras e grandes victorias que alcaçon o grande rey da Persia... por mandado... del Rey D. Felipe segundo de Portugal fizerao alguns religiosos da Ordem dos Eremitas de S. Augustinho a Persia / composto pello padre F. Antonio de Gouuea religioso da mesma ordem ...*, (Impresso em Lisboa, por Pedro Crasbeeck: vendese na rua romana en casa de Simao de Carualho ..., 1611). [13], 226 [i.e. 213], [4] h.; 4º, in Madrid, Real Academia de la Historia, 5/1708. Prospero del Espiritu Santo, (O. C. D.), *Breve suma de la Historia de los sucessos de la mision de Persia de los Carmelitas Descalços, desde el año de 1621 hasta el de 1624 / escrita por el Padre Fray Prospero del Espiritu Santo ... de la misma orden [Carmelitas Descalzós]*, (Madrid, por la viuda de Alonso Martin, 1626). 10 [i.e. 6] h.; Fol. Madrid, Palacio Real III-6474(9). *Relación cierta y verdadera de la feliz victoria y prósperos sucesos que en la India Oriental han conseguido los Portugueses, contra armadas muy poderosas de Olanda, y Persia este año de 1624, la fecha en la ciudad de Goa, cabeça de aquel Reyno a 27 de Março, del dicho año*, (Impresso en Madrid, en casa de Bernardino de Guzman, 1625). BNM, Mss./2355.
64. Martín Fernández de Figueroa, *Conquista de las Indias de Persia e Arabia que fizo la armada del rey don Manuel de Portugal e de las muchas tierras, diversas gentes, extrañas riquezas y grandes batallas que allá hubo: en sumario del bachiller Juan Agüero de Trasmiera*; introducción, edición crítica y notas de Luis Gil Fernández (Valladolid, Secretariado de Publicaciones e Intercambio Editorial, Universidad, 1999). García de Silva Figueroa, *Epistolario diplomático*; edición y estudios preliminares de Luis Gil, (Cáceres, Institución Cultural 'El Brocense', 1989). Véase: Niels Steensgaard, *The Asian Trade Revolution*. Biblioteca Real de Madrid, Ms. II/2590, 16, 32-33. Marqués de Hinojosa a Juan de Ziriza, Londres, 30-X-1623. 'Sobre que no se le ha respondido al particular de la hacienda que llegó allí robada a portugueses y de los despojos de Hormuz'.
65. B. Zimmel, 'Vorgeschichte und Gründung der Jesuitenmission in Isfahan, 1642-1657', in *Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft* 53 (1969), pp. 1-26.