Economic Crisis and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: The Case of Andalusia

Crisis económica y sentimiento antinmigrante: el caso de Andalucía

Sebastian Rinken

Abstract

This paper provides three interrelated reasons not to confound perceptions of economic group-threat with hostility toward people of foreign origin. Firstly, I argue that expansive notions of prejudice impede analyzing attitudes toward immigration and immigrants with sufficient precision. Secondly, the recent evolution in the Southern Spanish region of Andalusia illustrates divergent trajectories: anti-immigrant sentiment remained subdued despite surging unemployment and perceived conflict-of-interest. Thirdly, various factors are found to contain anti-immigrant sentiment amidst inauspicious economic circumstances and regardless of perceived group-competition. The study shows that attitudes towards immigrants hinge on a complex array of predispositions and perceptions, rather than economic facts and interests per se.

Palabras clave

Actitudes • Crisis económica • Inmigración • Paro • Prejuicios • Relaciones intergrupales • Xenofobia

Resumen

Este artículo proporciona tres razones conexas por las que percepciones de competencia grupal no deben confundirse con hostilidad hacia las personas de procedencia extranjera. Primero, se argumenta que concepciones expansivas del prejuicio acaban desdibujando el análisis de las actitudes en materia migratoria. Segundo, se observan trayectorias dispares de competencia grupal percibida, por un lado, y animosidad antinmigrante, por otro. Tercero, se identifican varios factores que disminuyen el sentimiento antinmigrante, pese a circunstancias económicas desalentadoras y al margen de competencia grupal percibida. El estudio demuestra que las actitudes hacia el colectivo inmigrante no dependen sin más de hechos e intereses económicos, sino de un complejo entramado de predisposiciones y percepciones.

Citation

**INTRODUCTION**

Throughout the past two decades Europe’s Mediterranean periphery has attracted massive inflows of labour migrants; however, from 2008 onwards the region was hit by a severe economic crisis. The boom-bust cycle of the Spanish labour market epitomises this challenging sequence; the unemployment rate surged beyond 35% in less-favoured areas such as Andalusia. How would native citizens react to this situation? Empirical and conceptual antecedents suggest that there is a risk of a backlash effect when immigration societies experience economic downturns. But such predictions have proven inaccurate to date in Spain, and specifically in Andalusia: although the mood concerning labour immigration soured, no wave of anti-immigrant sentiment arose.

By dwelling on this riddle, this paper aims to refine the conceptualisation of intergroup relations in an inauspicious context. After reviewing extant scholarship and time-trends involving different attitude facets, nine explanatory hypotheses concerning hostility-containment are tested with a logistic regression model, using data collected in the crisis’ sixth year (N=2,363). Two groups of predictors were distinguished: general predispositions that entail encompassing conceptions of group membership, and situational perceptions that reassure natives about their relative group-status. Three benevolent predispositions (leftist ideology, close contact, and Universalism) and three situational factors (re-emigration expectations, citizenship boundaries, and elite-blaming) were found to improve sentiment towards immigrants regardless of immigration’s perceived impact on the labour-market.

The competitive logic that underpins group-status perceptions is categorically different from principled immigration-friendly dispositions; such latent tension may eventually surface. Yet, this study shows that even in ominous labour-market conditions, natives’ attitudes toward allochthonous people hinge on both: sentiment toward immigrants is determined by a complex array of general dispositions and situational assessments, rather than by macro-economic context and perceived conflict-of-interest per se. Based on nuanced conceptualisation and measurement, this study challenges expansive notions of prejudice and simplistic versions of group-threat theory – two common features of extant scholarship.

**CONCEPTUALISATION AND MEASUREMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL**

As Ceobanu and Escandell (2010: 311-313) noted, many scholars tend to conflate the measurement of reactions to international migration as such (“attitudes towards immigration”), on the one hand, and views regarding people of foreign origin (“attitudes toward immigrants”), on the other, in a way that “poses potentially serious consequences for the validity and value of such research”. Survey items are often merged into indices without considering the possibility that “attitudes towards immigration may follow dynamics very different from those of attitudes towards immigrants”. The reigning “terminological ambiguity” is aggravated by the fact that attitudes towards immigrants are, more often than not, studied in terms of ethnic and racial prejudice, even though “not all immigrant-related attitudes have an explicit ethno-racial component”.

Far from regarding merely technical issues, and beyond the want of datasets that

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1 Survey data used in this study were generated by the Institute for Advanced Social Studies (IESA-CSIC) on behalf of Andalusia’s Migration Observatory (OPAM). Pilar Cortés-Sánchez and Manuel Trujillo lent invaluable statistical support. Anonymous REIS reviewers, members of IMISCOE’s Research Cluster on Southern Europe, and Dirk Godenau (ULL) contributed helpful comments on earlier drafts.
would allow for more nuanced operationalisations, these admonitions concern two widely-accepted conceptual premises of research on attitudes toward immigration and immigrants (hereinafter, ATII), namely:

1) The idea that any unfavourable view in this domain is essentially equivalent to anti-immigrant prejudice, and

2) The idea that attitudes towards immigrants are essentially synonymous with attitudes regarding ethnic and racial diversity.

These notions have taken hold in the research community, partly due to the difficulty in discerning legitimate qualms from rationalisations of prejudice, and partly to concerns about desirability-bias. “If lack of justification is used to define prejudice, who is to decide which justifications are legitimate and which are not?” (Esses et al., 1998: 720). On such grounds, in addition to the traditional focus on negative emotions (Allport, 1954: 9), any unfavourable views, including perceptions of intergroup competition, might be interpreted as a form of prejudice. Especially concerning the *explanandum* of multivariate models, such equations are common in otherwise sophisticated studies (see Riek et al., 2006: 341). “Implicit in most theoretical models about attitudes toward immigration is the idea that anti-immigration attitudes are a form of prejudice” (Wilkes et al., 2008: 303). As for desirability-bias, restraints against overt hostility are presumed to reflect awareness that prejudice is morally unacceptable. The quest for indirect, or subtle, indicators of animosity (Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995) has fuelled the acceptance of expansive notions of prejudice.

The same predictors are commonly employed with regard to both racist and anti-immigrant prejudice (e.g. Quillian, 1995), and intergroup attitudes are often studied in ways that equate “anti-immigrant sentiment” with “hostile ethnic stances” (e.g. Schlueter and Davidov, 2013). According to Cea-D’Ancona, “the measurement of xenophobia improves when migration policy indicators are used” (2014: 258). To some extent, such approaches reflect an empirical reality: many countries’ ethnic diversification originates from international migration. However, these conceptual mergers ignore the equally important fact that race relations and international migration generate different kinds of group conflicts. Whereas racial or ethnic discrimination is inherently inadmissible, the governance of citizenship in a globalised world legitimately entails, perhaps even requires, a differentiation of rights according to nationality and immigration status (Sainsbury, 2006; Soysal, 1994). Regarding this contentious matter, it seems inappropriate to posit unrestricted access to civic, social, and political rights as the only ethically acceptable stance. Yet, that position follows logically when “unfavourable ATII” and “xenophobia” are treated as synonyms.

The resulting confusion indeed stifles the validity and value of research. If qualms concerning immigration-related matters, as such, pass for evidence of gratuitous hostility, it becomes impossible to analyse the relationship between both aspects. And if any misgivings are de-legitimised as racist denigration, a meaningful debate on migration management becomes unviable. The intent of gauging the diffusion—net of response bias—of xenophobic and racial mindsets should not entail interpreting any sceptical assessment of international migration as intrinsically illegitimate hostility. Such conceptual fuzziness is detrimental to the aim of furthering knowledge on the social conditions in which “prejudiced personalities will be more numerous” than at other times and places (Allport, 1954: 221).

Allport’s list of prejudice-spurning context included a large or growing presence of the minority group, as well as situations of direct competition and conflict of interest. Under various labels (including group-threat, group-
competition, and group-conflict theory; hereinafter, GTT), this combination of factors has inspired legions of scholars. Although the "overreliance on the tradition of competitive threat" eventually "stunted the growth of alternative explanations" (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010: 310), much valuable knowledge on individual and country-level predictors of anti-immigrant sentiment was generated. Available research (e.g. Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010: 318-322; Semyonov et al., 2006: 427-430; Wilkes et al., 2008: 304-307) shows that perceptions of group-threat and ensuing manifestations of prejudice tend to be more common among people with low educational attainment, low-skill employment, right-wing ideology, and the unemployed. While "sociotropic concerns" (Sides and Citrin, 2007) mostly outweigh personal vulnerabilities, patterns of individual susceptibility were found to be reinforced amidst heightened objective threats, as predicated by out-group size and economic conditions (Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et al., 2002). A growing number of longitudinal studies (Coenders et al., 2005; Davidov and Meuleman, 2012; Hopkins, 2010; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013; Meuleman et al., 2009; Semyonov et al., 2006; Wilkes et al., 2008) add weight to these findings. Existing evidence is predominantly regarded to support GTT; yet "the state of the economy appears to be a stronger predictor of ATII than immigrant concentration" (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010: 322). However, some studies question if prejudice is indeed driven by objective conditions (Sides and Citrin, 2007), drawing attention to the relevance of perceptions regarding out-group size (Semyonov et al., 2004) and economic conditions (Billiet, Meuleman and De Witte, 2014; Kunovich, 2004).

To summarise, there are two problems with the current state of ATII research: GTT has degenerated into a "ready-for-use" commodity, and the clarity that characterised Allport’s thinking on group-conflict and prejudice has diminished alarmingly². Allport (1954: 233) acknowledged the difficulty in discerning "the pure tone" of realistic conflict from the "surrounding jangle" of related prejudice; however, the conceptual distinction between clashes of interest and gratuitous animosity was clear-cut. Allport stressed that conflicts of interest are not, as such, manifestations of prejudice; instead, he thought of prejudice as “excess baggage” that “clouded” any real issues. In contrast, the possibility of conceiving real issues as such has disappeared conceptually from many contemporary ATII studies.

This critique of established scholarship has practical implications: misgivings concerning immigration’s effects must not be equated with anti-immigrant sentiment, or even racism. The need for specific conceptualisation and measurement is illustrated in the next section: in Andalusia, animosity remained stable, it even receded, in a context of intensifying notions of conflict of interest. This puzzling attitude pattern would go undetected if perceptions of economic group-threat were equated with enmity.

**Andalusia’s “Intergroup Paradox”: Divergent Time-Trends**

Among the European countries afflicted by the multi-faceted crisis that started in 2008, it is well-known that Spain has undergone a particularly harsh deterioration of its labour-market. Internationally less known is the fact that in some parts of Spain the crisis struck even more severely. Andalusia’s unemployment rate exceeded 35% in 2013 – 20 points more than in 2008, about 10 points above the Spanish national average, and three times

² A noteworthy exception is the resurgent interest in person-positivity-bias (Iyengar et al., 2013), a line of research that distinguishes individual-level attitudes from group-level attitudes.
the EU average\(^3\). While these figures under-report shadow employment, they are plainly unsustainable. The region’s size and location enhance its interest as a case study: at 8.4 million, Andalusia’s population exceeds that of half the EU member states; a maritime Schengen border, it faces structural immigration pressure.

The crisis reversed an economic boom at the height of which Spain’s labour market incorporated half a million foreign workers annually (Aja et al., 2009). Andalusia attracted immigrants from Africa (mainly Morocco), Latin America, and Eastern Europe (mostly Romania), most of whom worked in agriculture, domestic services, catering, and the then-bristling construction industry. Within a decade, Andalusia’s foreign population quadrupled to 8.7% (around 20% in Almeria and Malaga provinces) (OPAM, 2013a). Immigration from less-developed countries continued to grow until 2010, and then stabilised at around 5.5% of registered inhabitants.

According to GTT, such a sequence of intense immigration and surging unemployment is prone to trigger intergroup tensions. A third of Andalusia’s adult population have not completed secondary education, and 12.5% of Spanish-national employees perform unskilled work—circumstances that might foster perceptions of competition for low-status employment (Mayda, 2006). Conditions in 2013 differed sharply from the 1990s, when any notion of group-threat seemed “to be constructed rather than actually experienced” (Escandell and Ceobanu, 2009: 66).

Perceptions of economic group-threat evolved roughly in parallel with unemployment rates, according to the OPIA survey (“Opiniones y actitudes de la población andaluza ante la inmigración”), which explores the opinions and attitudes of Andalusia’s Spanish-national residents specifically towards immigration from less-developed countries (comprising Romania and Bulgaria)\(^4\). As could be expected, the perceived usefulness of immigrant workers was hampered by the crisis (table I, item a). When asked about immigration’s downsides, in 2013 a majority of natives spontaneously mentioned the labour-market; in 2008, only a minority had done so. Perceived drawbacks were mostly associated with immigrants from less-developed countries in general, rather than specific subgroups. Since economic benefits had previously been seen as immigration’s main upside, the crisis caused overall impact assessments to deteriorate sharply: in 2013, two-thirds of Andalusians voiced unfavourable views (item b).

Many scholars would interpret such data as evidence of mounting hostility against people of foreign origin (see section 1); however, specific measurement suggests otherwise. Amidst the worst economic crisis in decades, few Andalusians expressed antipathy towards immigrants (item c); actually, after increasing slightly (2008-2011), manifest aversion receded. Other indicators of anti-immigrant acrimony (including generalised distrust or the explicit rejection of immigrant neighbours: items d and e) also showed low prevalence and inverse-U evolution. Available data imply that immigrants have not been converted into scapegoats for economic misfortunes; declining issue salience (item f) conveys the same conclusion. This is particularly remarkable, since mistrust of specific immigrant groups remains widespread (item g);

\(^3\) Employment data obtained from the Spanish Labour Force Survey (www.ine.es).

\(^4\) From 2005 through 2013, the Institute for Advanced Social Studies (IESA-CSIC) carried out five editions of OPIA on behalf of Andalusia’s Migration Observatory (OPAM, “Observatorio Permanente Andaluz de las Migraciones”); since 2008, the whole region has been covered and since 2010 the survey has combined landline and mobile users. Original samples ranged from 2,402 (2013) to 4,120 (2008) CATI interviews, with margins of sampling error at around 2%; samples used here (see table I) exclude foreign-born Spaniards.
Moroccans and Romanian Gypsies stand out for their “bad image”. Such ample diffusion of negative stereotypes suggests that specific populations might bear the brunt if intergroup relations were to deteriorate; qualitative evidence also alerts to that risk.

Why did such deterioration not occur despite a protracted economic downturn? The conflations that characterise much current scholarship would make that riddle invisible. Andalusia’s combination of dismal labour-market performance and diverging attitude trajectories constitutes a strategic research site which “effectively exhibit(s) the structure and workings of the phenomenon to be understood” (Merton, 1987: 11).

The Containment of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Times of Crisis

The first two sections of this paper resulted in a certainty and a query. The certainty is that the advancement of ATII research requires side-stepping the conflation of perceived group-conflict with xenophobic hostility. The ensuing query concerns the reasons for anti-immigrant sentiment (strictly speaking) to remain subdued amidst calamitous economic context. This riddle is concerned with sentiment towards groups, rather than specific individuals (Iyengar et al., 2013). However, it is not an entirely abstract attitude either, as it refers to groups of persons. Sentiment towards immigrants is located at the interface between “intergroup” and “ interpersonal” relations.

Following Allport’s (1954: 9) definition of prejudice as generalised antipathy towards a social group and its members (a core definition accepted even by otherwise feuding contemporary scholars, e.g. Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995; Coenders et al., 2001), this study focuses on manifest antipathy toward immigrants as explanandum. I assume explicit antipathy to differ qualitatively from other sentiments, whatever their exact nature.

Explanatory hypotheses

To identify a wide range of possible explanations, I rely on prior ATII scholarship and knowledge about national and regional-level institutions and policies (see Ceobanu and
Escandell, 2010; Hjerm, 2007; Zamora-Kapoor, 2013; Rinken, 2015). Two groups of factors are discerned: general predispositions versus situational perceptions (see Sniderman et al., 2004). The first category comprises normative and cognitive mindsets concerning the nature and extent of group membership; the overarching idea here is that more encompassing membership conceptions might counteract the impact of economic adversity on sentiment towards immigrants. In contrast to such principled views, the second category comprises rather volatile perceptions of the crisis, its origin, and its repercussions; situational factors are supposed to influence current intergroup relations without altering the underlying in-group/out-group dichotomy as such. In the following sections, I will develop five dispositional and four situational hypotheses.

Normative and cognitive predispositions

The prevalence of unfavourable ATII is known to vary across population segments: traits such as being young, well-educated, economically well-to-do, or politically left-leaning, predict more benevolent views. Among these features, ideology stands out as a plausible explanation for benign attitudes despite Andalusia’s labour-market being in the doldrums: ideological predispositions operate as “judgmental shortcuts” (Sniderman et al., 1991) that frame manifold issues, and the region’s political centre of gravity is markedly left-of-centre.

Contact theory offers another well-established and intuitively compelling explanation. Considering ignorance to cause prejudice, it assumes personal contact with immigrants, especially horizontal and close relationships (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Schlueter and Wagner, 2008), to re-define the in-group. Just as contact diminishes prejudice, prejudiced natives tend to avoid immigrants (cf. Pettigrew, 1998): regardless of the economic context, an inverse correlation of contact and animosity can be expected.

Interest-based explanations of hostility are routinely contrasted with explanations concerning cultural diversity (e.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Sides and Citrin, 2007); peaceful intergroup relationships despite the economic crisis might therefore be attributed to pro-diversity views. Strong formulations of this hypothesis (Schlueter et al., 2013) predict time-lagged out-group hostility to be minor where policies had been more immigrant-friendly. Spain pursued comparatively lenient policies regarding immigrants’ access to employment and public services (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011; Cebolla-Boado and González-Ferrer, 2008; Laparra, 2011); and Andalusia’s regional government sought a high profile in immigrant integration and intercultural openness (Martínez de Lizarrondo-Artola, 2009; Pérez-Yruela and Rinken, 2005). However, this domain is ambivalent: visible diversity-promotion receded as the crisis unfolded; negative stereotype remained widespread (table I, item g); and immigrant workers have reportedly suffered “racialised marginalisation” (Calavita, 2005).

In 2000, Spain’s markedly Universalist political culture was extended to immigration policy (Arango, 2013). Municipal population registries became the “true centrepiece of Spain’s model of immigration management and immigrant integration” (Cebolla-Boado and González-Ferrer, 2013: 162): access to ample civic and social rights was legally framed in terms of de facto residence, to the detriment of contention criteria such as nationality and administrative status. In line with the “social learning” paradigm, such policies might have contributed to containing anti-immigrant hostility: for practical purposes, all inhabitants would be seen to constitute essentially one group.

Spain’s history might also have fostered a distinctive inclination to dissimulate hostile attitudes toward foreign-born people: the democratic transition forged a political culture that dismisses any views associated with Franco-era nationalism as being reac-
tionary. If measurement were distorted by desirability bias (Phillips and Clancy, 1972), natives’ real sentiment would be less benevolent than stated in surveys. The disposition at stake here is eminently normative: it presupposed that people care to conceal adverse sentiment.

Perceptions of intergroup dynamics

GTT associates large and/or growing immigrant populations with intergroup tensions; therefore, decreasing populations should reduce animosity. Regarding Andalusia, Zamora-Kapoor (2013: 94) suggested that “the devastating effects of the current economic crisis have motivated out-migration flows, and these, in turn, have de-problematized immigration”. Akin to a safety valve, out-migration supposedly neutralises the unfavourable impact of economic adversity. Hence, if context conditions were to deteriorate further, re-emigration should accelerate, additionally fostering immigration’s de-problematisation: a virtuous circle of sorts. Yet, “it is not the actual (out-group) size per se that prompts anti-foreigners sentiments but it is the socio-psychological construct—perceived size of the out-group population that is associated with anti-foreigners sentiments” (Semyonov et al., 2004: 696; my emphasis). Scholars have routinely used natives’ (often exaggerated) estimates of immigrant populations to predict enmity; the same emphasis on perceptions should apply when addressing hostility-containment.

Zamora-Kapoor (2013: 98) noted that re-emigration is driven by immigrants’ precarious employment profiles and disproportionate job losses; however, she did not dwell on the conceptual implications of this observation (see Rinken, 2015: 66). To explain less prejudice among disadvantaged segments of economically strained immigration societies, Kunovich (2004: 25; 39-40) drew on group-position theory (Blumer, 1958) when venturing that, “Immigrants may be less threatening to disadvantaged groups if immigrants are disproportionately affected by economic downturns. (...) With worsening economic conditions, immigrants may fall further behind native workers, which could decrease the threat posed by immigrants and, thus, reduce negative attitudes toward them.”

The ensuing “status-trajectories” hypothesis—which again, should refer primarily to perceptions—transcends the socio-structural dichotomy examined by Kunovich. As Allport suggested, prejudiced personalities will be more numerous in times and places where “vertical mobility brings both incentive and alarm to members of society” (1954: 223). A “reverse-gear” version of this line of thinking predicts less animosity when immigrants are seen to suffer strong downward mobility.

Similar reasoning applies to government policy. Since “countries are responsible for creating and maintaining citizenship boundaries that identify to whom various rights and obligations are extended” (Kunovich, 2004: 41), backlash may arise if natives were to perceive citizenship boundaries as excessively nebulous; yet, anti-immigrant enmity should ease if the government were seen to impose pronounced setbacks on non-citizens. The latter perception might plausibly have been triggered when, in 2012, Spain’s centre-right government restricted irregular migrants’ previously unlimited access to public health-care. This measure’s symbolism might have extended to Andalusia as well, although the region’s Socialist government refused to implement the restrictions.

Kunovich (2004) proposed yet another explication of receding anti-immigrant enmity in disadvantaged populations, suggesting such patterns might be due to anger being directed toward politicians, rather than immigrants. Again, this hypothesis is empirically plausible: both in Andalusia and across
Spain, the political class emerged as a prominent social concern when protracted unemployment and austerity policies began to dent many Spaniards’ living standards; disaffection was also spurred by corruption scandals.

Model design and measurement

This study relies on cross-sectional data for hypothesis-testing; all predictions thus regard the prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiment in distinct segments of Andalusia’s population in 2013—the sixth year (and a posteriori, the nadir) of the labour-market downturn that had started in 2008. As far as general predispositions are concerned, anti-immigrant sentiment is predicted to be less common among people who adhere to leftist ideology (H1), maintain close personal contact with immigrants (H2), do not express worries about cultural diversity (H3), support immigrants’ equal access to opportunities and rights (H4), and are more inclined to conceal prejudiced views (H5). Concerning animosity-easing perceptions, sentiment is predicted to be more benign among natives who expect the immigrant population to diminish substantially (H6), perceive immigrants’ social position to deteriorate markedly (H7), perceive the government to protect citizenship boundaries adequately (H8), and blame elites for economic mismanagement and malaise (H9).

The first group of predictors refers to principled views on encompassing group membership; such explanations may at first sight appear to be excessively conventional, even endogenous. However, bearing in mind the dramatic levels of unemployment, their animosity-reducing capacities cannot be taken for granted; for example, the impact of leftist ideology might fade during an economic crisis (see Pardos-Prado, 2011). In addition to testing the enmity-containing properties of dispositional and situational factors in objectively inauspicious circumstances, this study examines whether their impact is affected by subjective threat perceptions.

Model design

A well-known procedure for analysing the conditional odds of events that differ qualitatively from non-events, binomial logistic regression is especially appropriate for hypothesis testing. As Mood (2010) stressed, such models’ effect estimates and their cross-group comparisons may be distorted by unobserved heterogeneity. However, such distortions underestimate predictor effects (Mood, 2010: 72); these are tested under more strenuous assumptions than in a fictitious model that fully explained all variance.

A binomial logistic regression model compares social groups with a view to the likelihood of the chosen event (manifest antipathy towards immigrants, in this study). One expression of each predictor variable was coded as reference category (hereinafter, RC); odds-ratios (ORs) were computed for the remaining expressions of that variable. If the OR is close to par, the event’s likelihood does not vary significantly across the specified groups; if it is below par, the comparison group is less likely to “score” an event than the RC; if the ratio exceeds par, that likelihood is higher. All other predictors are held constant: each predictor’s odds coefficient is computed regardless of other predictors’ values. When refining the model, the ORs of previously included predictors remain stable unless their effect on the dependent was altered by any of the additional predictors.

The model computed here relies on two fundamental decisions. Firstly, more animosity-prone expressions of all predictor varia-

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5 The Spanish Centre for Sociological Research (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) provides monthly data on issue salience (www.cis.es).

6 Largely identical questionnaires and sampling procedures were employed by the OPIA survey from 2005 through 2013, but indicators for the conceptually intriguing exodus expectation and status trajectories hypotheses are available for 2013 only.
bles were coded as RC; thus, ORs significantly below par confirm stated hypotheses. Secondly, the basic socio-demographic model (M1) was extended with indicators of economic threat (M2), prior to adding indicators concerning general predispositions (M3) and situational perceptions (M4), respectively. Thus, apart from testing stated hypotheses in an objectively inauspicious context, the model makes it possible to assess whether dispositional and situational factors reduce anti-immigrant animosity regardless of subjective perceptions of labour-market threat.

Interaction terms (M5) further examine two hypotheses. Concerning pro-diversity views (H3), one generic and one group-specific predictor were estimated; their interaction term captures consistent support for diversity. Similarly, exodus-expectations (H6) were supposed to be driven by perceived status losses (H7); the interaction term reveals how their combination affected sentiment towards immigrants.

Measurement

OPIA’s 2013 dataset (see section 2) was used; to discard naturalised immigrants, foreign-born respondents were excluded (N=2,363). To maximise interpretative transparency, the dependent was operationalised with a single item that captures the focal construct (explicit antipathy) quite literally: “how often have you felt sympathy for immigrants?” (table I, item c; see Appendix). Stating to have “never” or “hardly ever” felt sympathy for immigrants was coded as event (11% of cases qualify); all other answers were coded as non-event.

Explanatory hypotheses were operationalised as follows (see Appendix for details). Regarding H1, apart from three conventional groupings (left-of-centre; centre; right-of-centre), respondents unable or unwilling to self-rate their ideology (approximately one-fourth of the sample) were retained as a category. H2 was measured as counting immigrants among one’s friends and/or relatives (37% of natives did). H3 was tested with two items: generic support for immigrants maintaining their traditions (39.8% approved), and absence of group-specific mistrust (44.4%). H4 was gauged by support for immigrants’ full social participation (75% of natives approved). Educational attainment (three categories) served as rough proxy for assessing H5, on the assumption that the better-educated are more aware of social norms and better able to dissimulate prejudice; yet since education might also improve sincere sentiment, this indicator allows the rejection, but not the confirmation of H5. H6 was captured by the idea that economic stagnation would induce “a majority” of immigrants to leave (81.2% agree); as for H7, 56.9% agreed that immigrants are “one of the social groups most badly affected by the crisis”. Perceived dilution of citizenship boundaries was gauged as affirming that immigrants received “some” or “much” government protection, while not considering them a priority to that effect; almost 40% of natives stated this combination of views (H8). Elite-bashing (H9) was measured as mentioning politicians and/or corruption as outstanding social problem (33.7%).

Results

Multivariate results (ORs) are shown in table 27. Below-par ORs confirmed, while above-par values defied, our predictions of hostility-reducing capacities.

Socio-demographic profile: M1 and M2 portray men as being less prone to express an-
**TABLE 2.** Binomial logistic regression: manifest antipathy (Andalusia, 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M2</th>
<th>M3</th>
<th>M4</th>
<th>M5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Correctly classified</td>
<td>89.0%</td>
<td>89.0%</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>89.7%</td>
<td>89.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodness-of-fit (Nagelkerke)</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.347**</td>
<td>0.431**</td>
<td>0.744</td>
<td>1.236</td>
<td>0.904</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-demographic profile</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender: male</td>
<td>0.660**</td>
<td>0.635**</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>1.018</td>
<td>1.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age-group: 18-34 years</td>
<td>1.332</td>
<td>1.262</td>
<td>1.775**</td>
<td>1.488</td>
<td>1.541*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational attainment: secondary</td>
<td>0.554**</td>
<td>0.566**</td>
<td>0.563**</td>
<td>0.634**</td>
<td>0.629**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational attainment: tertiary</td>
<td>0.196**</td>
<td>0.212**</td>
<td>0.224**</td>
<td>0.300**</td>
<td>0.299**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology: centre</td>
<td>0.512**</td>
<td>0.525**</td>
<td>0.672</td>
<td>0.678</td>
<td>0.671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology: left-of-centre</td>
<td>0.419**</td>
<td>0.427**</td>
<td>0.553</td>
<td>0.575*</td>
<td>0.544*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology: not declared</td>
<td>0.923</td>
<td>0.912</td>
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<td>Habitat: low immigrant presence</td>
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<td>0.952</td>
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<td>Social class: middle to upper</td>
<td>0.786</td>
<td>0.806</td>
<td>0.745*</td>
<td>0.754</td>
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<th>Perceived economic threat (inverse)</th>
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<td>No ego-tropic threat</td>
<td>1.087</td>
<td>1.161</td>
<td>1.258</td>
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<td>No socio-tropic threat</td>
<td>0.562**</td>
<td>0.583**</td>
<td>0.572**</td>
<td>0.594**</td>
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<th>Predispositions (other than ideology &amp; educational attainment)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Contact</td>
<td>0.260**</td>
<td>0.277**</td>
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<td>Pro-diversity (generic)</td>
<td>0.802</td>
<td>0.749</td>
<td>1.440</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pro-diversity (specific)</td>
<td>1.549**</td>
<td>1.431**</td>
<td>2.094**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>0.308**</td>
<td>0.314**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exodus expectation</td>
<td>0.584**</td>
<td>0.649</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Status trajectories</td>
<td>1.485*</td>
<td>1.636</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizenship boundaries</td>
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<td>Elite-bashing</td>
<td>0.446**</td>
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<td>Exodus expectation*Status trajectories</td>
<td>0.895</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pro-diversity (generic)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pro-diversity (specific)</td>
<td>0.327</td>
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</table>

Notes: Andalusia’s Spanish-national residents, including double nationality, ages 18+, were surveyed. See Appendix for question wording, coding, and reference categories. *Significant at 5% (p<0.05); **Significant at 1% (p<0.01). Squared error in brackets.

Source: OPAM, OPIA survey (wave V); N=2,363 (excluding foreign-born interviewees).
tipathy than women (M2, OR=0.635**); this effect ceases in M3, implying that immigration-friendly predispositions were more common among men. For analogous reasons, when holding predispositions constant, young people (18-34 years) were clearly more animosity-prone (M3, OR=1.755**) than their peers in the 50+ age-group (RC), a result that alerts to a hardening of sentiment among some native youths. Contrasting extant research (Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013; Valdez, 2014), self-declared social class exerted little impact; and interestingly, the share of immigrants in the interviewees’ neighbourhood had no discernible effect. H1 was confirmed: left-of-centre ideology reduced manifest animosity, especially before taking other predispositions into account (M2, OR=0.427**). Centrist views had a similar, yet less-pronounced effect; however, respondents who declined to self-rate their ideology were just as animosity-prone as overt right-wingers (RC). As expected, better (especially university-level) educational attainment reduced explicit antipathy; this effect remained fully intact when situational factors were added (M4, OR=0.562**; M5, OR=0.572**).

**Predispositions (other than ideology and educational attainment):** Confirming H2 and H4, close contact (M3, OR=0.260**) and Universalist views (M3, OR=0.308**) clearly reduced anti-immigrant animosity; both effects persisted fully when situational factors were added (M4). Concerning H3, important qualifications emerged: generic pro-diversity views failed to significantly reduce, and absence of group-specific mistrust even increased, animosity (M3, OR=1.549**). Anti-immigrant sentiment receded strongly when pro-diversity views were voiced on both counts (M5, OR=0.266**); yet among those lacking such coherent convictions, anti-immigrant antipathy increased when reticence toward specific groups was not articulated (M5, OR=2.094**), as compared to when it was (RC). This suggests that group-specific mistrust did not impede sympathetic, or at least neutral, sentiment toward immigrants in general; however, the reverse assessment seems just as appropriate.

**Perceptions of economic threat:** Contradicting extant studies (e.g. Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013), and despite severe labour-market downturn, absence of ego-tropic threat did not reduce the odds of animosity significantly; actually, albeit short of customary significance thresholds, the inverse seemed to apply when holding dispositional and situational factors constant (M4, OR=1.258). In contrast, GTT was vindicated in that anti-immigrant sentiment diminished consistently when no socio-tropic threat was voiced. Note that this predictor’s effect was stable when controlling for dispositional and situational factors (M2, OR=0.562**; M4, OR=0.572**).
Discussion

The empirical evidence presented in this paper is limited in various ways. The focal construct, the explicit manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment, was measured as a single-item dichotomised variable; while justified in terms of interpretative transparency, this choice leaves scope for alternative options. To maximise the range of testable predictors regarding sentiment toward immigrants amidst extraordinarily bleak economic context, a cross-sectional model was computed; future inquiries should exploit multi-survey or panel datasets, where available, and perhaps also explore experimental designs. And although its size, location, migration history, economic record, and attitude trajectories make Andalusia a compelling case-study, future research should address cross-territorial comparisons; Europe’s crisis-stricken Southern periphery is an obvious priority.

Despite these limitations, this study adds significantly to extant knowledge on intergroup relations in economically troubled times. Its conceptual and methodological starting point is the insight that expansive notions of prejudice entail an unacceptable loss of accuracy. When equating any misgivings about immigration with the denigration of Otherness, scholars may be adding insult to (perceived) injury; that risk is especially palpable during protracted economic downturns. From a dynamic perspective, the paper shows that attitudes toward immigrants may evolve very differently from views concerning the impact and management of international migration, and indeed, perceptions of economic group-threat. Focusing on a setting marked by record unemployment, this paper identifies two sets of factors that improve sentiment towards immigrants, regardless of whether or not natives voice misgivings about immigration’s labour-market effects: general predispositions regarding the nature and extent of group membership, on one hand, and specific perceptions of current intergroup dynamics, on the other.

Nine explanatory hypotheses were tested, five of which refer to predispositions, and four to situational perceptions. One situational hypothesis was rejected in intriguing ways: rather than receding, animosity was found to increase among natives who viewed immigrants as especially vulnerable to the crisis’ impact. On the assumption that natives perceive the plight of immigrant workers as an ominous precedent for their own occupational prospects, this finding adds an interesting nuance to group-position theory (Kunovich, 2004): fear of status contagion appears to take priority over the relative comfort of immigrants’ unfavourable status trajectories. Future research should follow up on this interpretation, which seems plausible in circumstances where unemployment and austerity policies exert downward pressure on salaries and work conditions. Also pinpointing future research needs, two dispositional hypotheses were confirmed with qualifications only. Social desirability might distort verbalisations of anti-immigrant sentiment, although this study does not prove such bias, much less quantify its extent. And while coherent pro-diversity views were found to reduce animosity, a trade-off between generalised antipathy and mistrust towards specific immigrant groups emerged when such consistent convictions were absent.

Six hypotheses, three of which refer to dispositional factors and the other three to situational factors, were unequivocally confirmed. Animosity was found to be less prevalent among natives who professed left-of-centre ideology, maintained close contact with immigrants, and supported universal access to social rights, as well as those who expected a majority of immigrants to re-emigrate, perceived the government to protect citizenship boundaries, and blamed elites for economic malaise. These six factors reduced anti-immigrant sentiment, regardless of whether or not immigration was viewed as economically det-
Economic Crisis and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: The Case of Andalusia

In a context where a third of the workforce was unemployed. In such inauspicious circumstances, the hostility-appeasing role of benign predispositions cannot be taken for granted. This study’s results contradict the common expectation that economic downturns inevitably drive anti-immigrant sentiment to expand beyond ill-disposed core constituencies. Instead, a spill-over in the opposite direction was observed: various situational perceptions were found to reduce anti-immigrant sentiment when controlling both for perceived conflict-of-interest and an assortment of general dispositions. Three immigration-friendly predispositions (left-of-centre ideology, close contact, and Universalism) fully preserved their animosity-reducing capacities regardless of how current events were conceived; and three situational factors (re-emigration expectations, citizenship boundaries, and elite-blaming) improved sentiment toward immigrants, regardless of whether or not natives shared such benign predispositions. What is more, both sets of factors were found to exert their impact regardless of whether or not natives voiced qualms about the effect of immigration on the labour-market. Beyond the specifics of these six explanatory factors, the paper’s main finding is that even in a highly inauspicious context and despite widespread scepticism concerning immigration’s cost-benefit balance, virulent anti-immigrant sentiment may be kept in check by a combination of predispositions and perceptions.

In conclusion, this study highlights how sentiment towards immigrants in crisis-stricken immigration societies hinges on a complex array of manifold dispositional and situational factors, as opposed to macro-economic conditions and interests per se; any notion of straightforward economic determinism is definitely rejected by these findings. Group-threat theory is not proved wrong; rather, it proves woefully incomplete. This study shows that perceptions of economic conflict of interest are just one among a range of features and issues that determine natives’ sentiment toward the foreign-born. A combination of benevolent predispositions nurtured by historical and cultural idiosyncrasies, on the one hand, and reassuring perceptions regarding the predominant group-status of natives, on the other, seems well-suited to account for natives’ rather benign sentiment toward immigrants in a bleak economic context.

However, complex causalities do not convey immunity against anti-immigrant backlash. Universalist credentials may be put to a litmus test when the “temporal illusion” (Freeman, 1995) fades; expectations of massive re-emigration might prove unfounded and excessive levels of unemployment might persist; and if the dynamics of political competition were to change, immigration might again emerge as a salient issue. Eventually, unresolved tensions are likely to surface between encompassing group-membership conceptions and the “we-versus-them” logic of relative group-status. In the face of such challenges, this study might inspire institutional actors aiming to safeguard social cohesion, and researchers ready to salvage the distinction between misgivings about international migration, on the one hand, and animosity toward immigrants, on the other.

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**RECEPTION:** March 26, 2015  
**REVIEW:** May 27, 2015  
**ACCEPTANCE:** November 11, 2015
APPENDIX: QUESTIONNAIRE WORDING AND CODING DECISIONS

Abbreviations: explicit response categories (EC); additional coding categories (AC); doesn’t know/doesn’t answer (DK/DA); reference category for regression model (RC). Spanish questionnaire wording (OPAM 2013b, 160-170) can be tracked with position codes (e.g., P7).

**Item trajectories (table I)**

(a): “As you know, there are immigrants from less developed countries living in Andalusia. (…) What negative effects does this type of immigration have for Andalusia, in your opinion?” (P7). Open question; multiple response.

(b): “Generally speaking, do you think that immigration is very positive, rather positive, rather negative, or very negative for Andalusia?” (P9). AC: neither/nor, depends, DK/DA.

(c): “How often have you felt sympathy for immigrants?” (P17). EC: many times, quite a few times, sometimes, hardly ever, never. AC: depends, DK/DA.

(d): “In conclusion, when now thinking about immigrants in general, how much trust do you think they merit?” (P27). EC: a lot of trust, some trust, a little trust, no trust at all. AC: depends, DK/DA.

(e): “If you had to decide where to live, which of these three places would you choose?” (P20). EC: a place where almost nobody was immigrant, a place where some people were immigrants, a place where many people were immigrants. AC: don’t care, DK/DA.

(f): “In order of priority, which are the three most pressing problems for Andalusians, in your opinion?” (P1). Open response.

(g): “Is there any particular group [of immigrants] which you trust less?” (P26_1). EC: yes, no. AC: DK/DA.

**Model estimators (table II)**

Dependent: item (c) (table I). Codification: “hardly ever” + “never” (event)/ rest.


Economic threat perceptions. Egotropic: “Throughout the past five years, have you at some point found yourself (…) facing the threat of unemployment?” (E7_1). EC: yes, no, DK/DA. Codification: no/ rest of options (RC). Sociotropic: item (a) (table I). Codification: mentioning labour market (RC)/ rest of sample.

Predispositions. Ideology: see “profile’. Contact: “What sort of relationship are you referring to? (P18_3_1_filtered). Multiple response. EC: friendship, work, family or partner, neighbourhood, buying in places with immigrant employees or owners. AC: other. Codification: friendship and-or family/ rest of sample (RC). Pro-diversity (generic): “Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree (…): immigrants should be able to live...
here according to their customs’ (P15_1). AC: depends, DK/DA. Codification: “strongly agree’ or “agree’/ rest (RC). Pro-diversity (specific): item (g) (table I). Codification: rest (RC)/ “no’. Universalism: “Immigrants should be able to fully participate in our society’ (P16_1). EC: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree. AC: neither/nor, depends, only those authorised to live in Andalusia, DK/DA. Codification: (strongly) agree/ rest (RC). Desirability-bias: see “educational attainment’.

*Perceived intergroup dynamics. Exodus expectation:* “When there is no economic growth, a majority of immigrants leave’ (P13_2_3). EC: agree, disagree. AC: neither/nor, depends, DK/DA. Codification: agree/ rest (RC). Status trajectories: “Immigrants are one of the social groups most badly affected by the crisis’ (P13_5). EC: agree, disagree. AC: neither/nor, depends, DK/DA. Codification: agree/ rest (RC). Citizenship boundaries: “Would you please tell me whether the following groups presently receive much, some, little or no protection from the government? … immigrants’ (P4_5). AC: DK/DA. “And in your opinion, which [two] groups should be most protected by the State?’ (P5). EC: Older people, unemployed people, young people, middle class, immigrants. AC: all of them, DK/DA. Codification: “much’ or “some’ government protection for immigrants (P4_5) but immigrants not a priority (P5) (RC)/ rest of sample. Elite-bashing: item (f) (table I). Codification: reference to political class or corruption/ rest of sample (RC).