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DerechosPreviewFecha Public.TítuloAutor(es)Tipo
1openAccessF. Klijn Economics Letters.pdf.jpgene-2020Improving schools through school choice: An experimental study of deferred acceptanceKlijn, Flip CSIC ORCID ; Pais, Joana; Vorsatz, Marcartículo
2openAccessSome things couples.pdf.jpg2007Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip CSIC ORCID ; Massó, Jordiartículo
3openAccess75708.pdf.jpg17-nov-2008Constrained School Choice: An Experimental StudyCalsamiglia, Caterina; Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip CSIC ORCID documento de trabajo
4openAccessKlijn-IGameTheoryReview-2013-v15-p1340008.pdf.jpg13-sep-2011Matching with couples: A multidisciplinary surveyBiró, Péter; Klijn, Flip CSIC ORCID artículo
5openAccessF. Klijn International Journal of Game Theory.pdf.jpg6-mar-2019The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairsJaramillo, Paula; Kayi, Çagatay; Klijn, Flip CSIC ORCID artículo
6openAccessKlijn-JMathematicalEconomics-2014-v54-p63.pdf.jpg30-ago-2014A many-to-many 'rural hospital theorem'Klijn, Flip CSIC ORCID ; Yazici, Ayseartículo
7openAccess65305.pdf.jpg15-sep-2005Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of CouplesKlaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip CSIC ORCID documento de trabajo
8openAccess60404.pdf.jpg1-dic-2005Paths to stability for matching markets with couplesKlaus, Bettinadocumento de trabajo
9openAccess70807.pdf.jpg18-jun-2007Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples [Revised Version]Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip CSIC ORCID ; Nakamura, Toshifumidocumento de trabajo
10openAccess51402.pdf.jpg14-jun-2002A Generalized Assignment GameCamiña, Esterdocumento de trabajo
11openAccessKlijn-A-many-to-many-GSEWorkingPaper-2014-n567.pdf.jpgjun-2011A Many-to-Many Rural Hospital TheoremKlijn, Flip CSIC ORCID ; Yazici, Aysedocumento de trabajo
12openAccessFlip_games_ economic_behavior.pdf.jpgjul-2017Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stabilityKlaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip CSIC ORCID artículo
13openAccess57703.pdf.jpg16-may-2003On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching modelMartínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; Oviedo, Jorgedocumento de trabajo
14openAccess87711.pdf.jpg27-jun-2011A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem'Klijn, Flip CSIC ORCID documento de trabajo
15openAccessKlijn_economics_letters_2016.pdf.jpgjul-2016Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete listsKlaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip CSIC ORCID artículo
16openAccess63204.pdf.jpg16-feb-2006Median Stable Matching for College AdmissionKlaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip CSIC ORCID documento de trabajo
Resultados 1-16 de 16.

 

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