English   español  
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/61661
Title: When Trust Is Not Enough
Authors: Debenham, John; Sierra, Carles
Issue Date: 2011
Publisher: Springer
Citation: E-Commerce and Web Technologies. 12th International Conference, EC-Web 2011, Toulouse, France, August 30 - September 1, 2011. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol. 85, pp. 246-257.
Abstract: The degree of trust that an agent has for another is the strength of the agent’s belief that the other will enact its commitments without variation. A strong sense of trust may be sufficient justification for one agent to sign a contract with another when all that matters is the possibility of variation between commitment and enactment. In non-trivial contracts the agents’ information is typically asymmetric with each agent knowing more about its ability to vary its actions within its contractual constraints than the other. To enable an agent to deal with the asymmetry of information we propose two models. First, a relationship model that describes what one agent knows about another, including the belief that it has in the reliability of that information. Second an integrity model where integrity is the strength of an agent’s belief that the other will not take advantage of its information asymmetries when enacting its commitments.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/61661
Identifiers: isbn: 978-3-642-23013-4
Appears in Collections:(IIIA) Comunicaciones congresos
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
EC-Web 2011. LNBIP 85. pp.246-257.pdf210,14 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Show full item record

WARNING: Items in Digital.CSIC are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.