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http://hdl.handle.net/10261/58971
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dc.contributor.author | Burguet, Roberto | - |
dc.contributor.author | Caminal, Ramón | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-10-26T10:01:19Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-10-26T10:01:19Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010-08-17 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Econometric Society World Congress 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/58971 | - |
dc.description | Comunicación presentada en The Econometric Society World Congress, celebrado del 17 al 21 de agosto de 2010 en Shanghai (China) | - |
dc.description | Comunicación presentada en The Barcelona JOCS game theory seminar organizado por Barcelona GSE (Graduate School of Economics), el 22 de marzo de 2009 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We propose and analyze a new solution concept, the R-solution, for three-person, cooperative games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, the solution is founded on the analysis of the parallel, two-party negotiations that would be the alterna- tive to the grand coalition. We compare the predictions of the R-solution with those of the Shapley value, and also show that the R-solution belongs to the Core whenever the latter is not empty. Finally, we discuss how the R-solution changes impor- tant conclusions of the Industrial Organization literature that deals with renegotiation in incomplete contracting frameworks. | - |
dc.description.sponsorship | We acknowledge the support of the Barcelona GSE, Generalitat de Catalunya, and Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (project ECO2008-01850). | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press | - |
dc.rights | openAccess | - |
dc.subject | Cooperative games | - |
dc.subject | simultaneous negotiations | - |
dc.subject | RSolution | - |
dc.subject | incomplete contracts | - |
dc.title | Three is a crowd: A new cooperative solution concept for three-player games that takes parallel, bilateral negotiations to the center stage | - |
dc.type | comunicación de congreso | - |
dc.date.updated | 2012-10-26T10:01:20Z | - |
dc.description.version | Peer Reviewed | - |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794 | es_ES |
item.openairetype | comunicación de congreso | - |
item.grantfulltext | open | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.languageiso639-1 | en | - |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Comunicaciones congresos |
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Three is a crowd.pdf | 261,22 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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