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Título : Three is a crowd: A new cooperative solution concept for three-player games that takes parallel, bilateral negotiations to the center stage
Autor : Burguet, Roberto, Caminal, Ramón
Palabras clave : cooperative games
simultaneous negotiations
incomplete contracts
Fecha de publicación : 17-Aug-2010
Editor: Cambridge University Press
Resumen: We propose and analyze a new solution concept, the R-solution, for three-person, cooperative games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, the solution is founded on the analysis of the parallel, two-party negotiations that would be the alterna- tive to the grand coalition. We compare the predictions of the R-solution with those of the Shapley value, and also show that the R-solution belongs to the Core whenever the latter is not empty. Finally, we discuss how the R-solution changes impor- tant conclusions of the Industrial Organization literature that deals with renegotiation in incomplete contracting frameworks.
Descripción : Comunicación presentada en The Econometric Society World Congress, celebrado del 17 al 21 de agosto de 2010 en Shanghai (China)
Comunicación presentada en The Barcelona JOCS game theory seminar organizado por Barcelona GSE (Graduate School of Economics), el 22 de marzo de 2009
Citación : Econometric Society World Congress 2010
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Comunicaciones congresos

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