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Título: | Endogenous Mergers and Bargaining Failures |
Autor: | Caminal, Ramón CSIC ORCID ; Burguet, Roberto CSIC ORCID | Fecha de publicación: | 2011 | Editor: | European Association for Research in Industrial Economics | Citación: | 38th Annual Conference: (2011) | Resumen: | In this paper we study endogenous mergers in a model of strategic bargaining. We allow for firm asymmetries and, in particular, we emphasize the fact that potential synergies generated by a merger vary depending on the identity of the participating firms. We make two main contributions. The first is to show that relatively inefficient mergers may take place. That is, a particular merger may materialize despite the existence of an alternative merger capable of generating larger synergies and hence higher profits and higher social surplus. Our second contribution is a methodological one. We use a bargaining model that is flexible, in the sense that its strategic structure does not place any restriction on the endogenous likelihood of feasible mergers. | Descripción: | Comunicación presentada tambien al "9th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference" USA 2011 y al "European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) Suecia 2011. | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/58710 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Comunicaciones congresos |
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Endogenous mergers.pdf | 195,14 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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