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Título : Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint
Autor : Jaramillo, Paula, Kayi, Ç, Klijn, Flip
Fecha de publicación : 2012
Editor: Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
Citación : Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series, nº 610
Resumen: We want to allocate an object among two agents who have property rights over the object; the dispossessed agent and the owner, and compensate the one who does not get the object. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee the participation of both agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.
Descripción : Trabajo presentado como comunicación de congreso al "3rd UECE Lisbon Meeting on Game Theory and Applications" (2011); al Workshop "Recent Developments in Market Design" (2011); al "VIII Encuentro de la Red Española en Elección Social" (2011); y al "XXXVI Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía" (2011).
Appears in Collections:(IAG) Informes y documentos de trabajo

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