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Título: | Strategic bargaining with firm inventories |
Autor: | Coles, Melvin G. CSIC; Smith, E. | Fecha de publicación: | 1998 | Editor: | Elsevier | Citación: | Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 23(1): 35-54 (1998) | Resumen: | This paper characterizes how a firm's opportunity to sell from its stock of inventories affects the outcome of strategic wage negotiations with a union of workers. In equilibrium, the union and firm share the benefits from an immediate return to work less the costs of a strike of infinite duration. This outcome is equivalent to a Nash bargaining solution in which the threat points are the agents' expected payoffs should a strike last forever. We also demonstrate that for a given level of inventories, the wage increases when demand is high. Conversely, given demand, the wage falls as inventories rise. | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/58372 | DOI: | 10.1016/S0165-1889(97)00108-5 | Identificadores: | doi: 10.1016/S0165-1889(97)00108-5 issn: 0165-1889 |
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