Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57873
COMPARTIR / EXPORTAR:
SHARE CORE BASE | |
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL | DATACITE | |
Título: | Interbank competition with costly screening |
Autor: | Freixas, Xavier; Hurkens, Sjaak CSIC ORCID ; Morrison, Alan D.; Vulkan, Nir | Fecha de publicación: | 2007 | Editor: | Berkeley Electronic Press | Citación: | BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 7(1): (2007) | Resumen: | We analyze credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker's (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market efficiency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have differing screening abilities. Copyright © 2007 The Berkeley Electronic Press. All rights reserved. | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57873 | DOI: | 10.2202/1935-1704.1356 | Identificadores: | doi: 10.2202/1935-1704.1356 e-issn: 1935-1704 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Artículos |
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero | Descripción | Tamaño | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Interbank Competition.pdf | 219,3 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
CORE Recommender
SCOPUSTM
Citations
12
checked on 12-abr-2024
Page view(s)
411
checked on 23-abr-2024
Download(s)
330
checked on 23-abr-2024
Google ScholarTM
Check
Altmetric
Altmetric
NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.