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Title: A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity
Authors: Segal, U., Sobel, Joel
Issue Date: 2008
Publisher: Springer
Abstract: This paper studies a game-theoretic model in which players have preferences over their strategies. These preferences vary with the strategic context. The paper further assumes that each player has an ordering over an opponent's strategies that describes the niceness of these strategies. It introduces a condition that insures that the weight on an opponent's utility increases if and only if the opponent chooses a nicer strategy. © 2007 Springer Verlag.
Identifiers: doi: 10.1007/s00182-007-0085-2
issn: 0020-7276
e-issn: 1432-1270
Citation: International Journal of Game Theory 36(3-4): 571- 585 (2008)
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