Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/37460
COMPARTIR / EXPORTAR:
SHARE BASE | |
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL | DATACITE | |
Título: | Growth, Selection and Appropriate Contracts |
Autor: | Bonfiglioli, Alessandra CSIC ORCID; Gancia, Gino | Palabras clave: | Information Selection Appropriate contracts Development Growth Appropriate institutions |
Fecha de publicación: | 17-jun-2011 | Citación: | UFAE and IAE Working Papers; 876.11 | Resumen: | We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced tend to choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates a trade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificing managerial selection may be optimal at early stages of economic development and when access to information is limited. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increases the return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, where managerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Better institutions, in the form of a richer contracting environment and less severe informational frictions, speed up the transition to short-term relationships. | Descripción: | JEL Classi cation: D8, O40. | Versión del editor: | http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2011/87611.pdf | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/37460 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo |
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero | Descripción | Tamaño | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|---|
87611.pdf | 233,92 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
CORE Recommender
Page view(s)
273
checked on 17-abr-2024
Download(s)
149
checked on 17-abr-2024
Google ScholarTM
Check
NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.