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Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests

AuthorsAshlagi, Itai; Klijn, Flip
Deferred acceptance
Issue Date14-Jun-2010
CitationUFAE and IAE Working ; 835.10.
AbstractWe study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model
DescriptionTrabajo presentado a: "The 1st Annual UECE - Lisbon Meeting on Game Theory and Applications" celebrado en Lisboa en 2009; "Conference on Economic Design (CoED)" celebrada en Canada en 2011.-- Trabajo publicado como artículo en Social Choice and Welfare 39(1): 23-33 (2012).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0549-y
Publisher version (URL)http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2010/83510.pdf
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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