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Improving schools through school choice: An experimental study of deferred acceptance

AuthorsKlijn, Flip ; Pais, Joana; Vorsatz, Marc
KeywordsSchool choice
Deferred acceptance
School quality
Issue DateJan-2020
PublisherElsevier BV
CitationEconomics Letters 186: 108853 (2020)
AbstractIn the context of school choice, we experimentally study the student-optimal stable mechanism where subjects take the role of students and schools are passive. Specifically, we study if a school can be better off when it unambiguously improves in the students’ true preferences and its (theoretic) student-optimal stable match remains the same or gets worse. Using first-order stochastic dominance to evaluate the schools’ distributions over their actual matches, we find that schools’ welfare almost always changes in the same direction as the change of the student-optimal stable matching, i.e., incentives to improve school quality are nearly idle.
Publisher version (URL)http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108853
Identifiersdoi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108853
issn: 0165-1765
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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