Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1949
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dc.contributor.authorBeviá, Carmen-
dc.contributor.authorBarberà, Salvador-
dc.date.accessioned2007-11-08T15:15:01Z-
dc.date.available2007-11-08T15:15:01Z-
dc.date.issued2000-11-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1949-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing envy-free allocation consistent rules, we also explore whether such rules may also respect the Condorcet criterion.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipOur work is partially supported by DGCYT and Direcció General de Recerca under projects PB98-0870 and SGR98-0062.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUFAE and IAE Working Papersen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries468.00en_US
dc.rightsopenAccessen_US
dc.subjectConsistencyen_US
dc.subjectCondorcet criterionen_US
dc.titleSelf-Selection Consistent Functionsen_US
dc.typedocumento de trabajoen_US
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042es_ES
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.grantfulltextopen-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
item.openairetypedocumento de trabajo-
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