Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1949
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Title

Self-Selection Consistent Functions

AuthorsBeviá, Carmen; Barberà, Salvador
KeywordsConsistency
Condorcet criterion
Issue DateNov-2000
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers
468.00
AbstractThis paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing envy-free allocation consistent rules, we also explore whether such rules may also respect the Condorcet criterion.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1949
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo




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