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Título: | Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences |
Autor: | Rodríguez-Alvarez, Carmelo | Palabras clave: | Candidate Stability Voting Correspondence Extension Criterion |
Fecha de publicación: | 11-jul-2001 | Serie: | UFAE and IAE Working Papers 492.01 |
Resumen: | We study the incentives of candidates to enter or to exit elections in order to strategically affect the outcome of a voting correspondence. We extend the results of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2000), who only considered single-valued voting procedures by admitting that the outcomes of voting may consist of sets of candidates. We show that, if candidates form their preferences over sets according to Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian updating, every unanimous and non dictatorial voting correspondence violates candidate stability. When candidates are restricted to use even chance prior distributions, only dictatorial or bidictatorial rules are unanimous and candidate stable. We also analyze the implications of using other extension criteria to define candidate stability that open the door to positive results. | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1921 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo |
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