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Campo DC | Valor | Lengua/Idioma |
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dc.contributor.author | Klaus, Bettina | - |
dc.contributor.author | Klijn, Flip | - |
dc.contributor.author | Massó, Jordi | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-11-06T08:03:55Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2007-11-06T08:03:55Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1861 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. Roth and Peranson in Am Econ Rev 89:748–780, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when couples’ preferences are ‘responsive’, i.e., when Gale and Shapley’s (Am Math Monthly 69:9–15, 1962) deferred acceptance algorithm (on which the old NRMP algorithm is based) is applicable. Second, we demonstrate that the new NRMP algorithm may also be anipulated by couples acting as singles. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | B. Klaus’s and F. Klijn’s research is supported by Ramón y Cajal contracts of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. The main part of F. Klijn’s work was supported by a Marie Curie Fellowship of the European Community Programme “Improving Human Research Potential and the Socio-economic Knowledge Base” under contract number HPMF-CT-2001-01232, carried out at the Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. The work of the authors is partially supported by Research Grant BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and by the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Springer Nature | - |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Review of Economic Design 11(3): 175-184 (2007) | en_US |
dc.rights | openAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | Matching | en_US |
dc.subject | Couples | en_US |
dc.subject | Responsiveness | en_US |
dc.subject | Stability | en_US |
dc.title | Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) | en_US |
dc.type | artículo | en_US |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | es_ES |
item.languageiso639-1 | en | - |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.grantfulltext | open | - |
item.openairetype | artículo | - |
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Some things couples.pdf | 243,15 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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