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Title

Efficient Priority Rules

AuthorsEhlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina
KeywordsAcyclical priority structuresss
Deferred acceptance algorithm
Indivisible objects
Priority rules
Issue Date9-Dec-2002
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers
554.02
AbstractWe study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1859
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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